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I. INTRODUCTION
The doctrine requiring physicians to obtain a patient's informed consent
before undertaking treatment is relatively young, having first appeared in a
recognizable, relatively robust form only in 1957. Yet the values that underlie
the doctrine have an ancient pedigree. The consent norm had occupied a
prominent and honored place in our legal thought for many centuries before
the courts began to develop a jurisprudence of informed consent in health
care.2 Also well established was the cognate notion that consent must be
informed or knowledgeable in some meaningful sense if we are to accord it
legal or moral significance.
3
Consent is the master concept that defines the law of contracts in the
United States. First, consent expresses the primacy of individualistic values in
our culture. To say that one cannot be bound by a promise that one did not
voluntarily and knowingly make is to say that the individual should be the
author of her own undertakings, that a genuine respect for her dignity requires
a broad deference to her choices. It is to say that she alone can define the
nature of her relationships with others-except to the extent that the state is
1. See JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 48-84 (1984); see also RUTH R.
FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT 235-73 (1986).
In this Article, I often refer to "physicians" rather than the more generic category "health care
providers," although the informed consent obligation applies to anyone who undertakes treatment.
2. See, e.g., Ford v. Ford, 10 N.E. 474, 475 (Mass. 1887) ("[The absence of lawful consent is part
of the definition of an assault.") (citing Christopherson v. Bare, 116 Eng. Rep. 554, 556 (1848)). For a
discussion of the traditional role of the consent doctrine in health care, see O'Brien v. Cunard S.S. Co., 28
N.E. 266 (Mass. 1891), Bennan v. Parsonnet, 83 A. 948 (N.J. 1912), and Hively v. Higgs, 253 P. 363 (Or.
1927).
3. See, e.g., Choctaw, Okla. & Gulf Ry. v. Jones, 92 S.W. 244, 248 (Ark. 1906); Baer v. Baird
Mach. Co., 79 A. 673, 675 (Conn. 1911); Fitzgerald v. Connecticut River Paper Co., 29 N.E. 464 (Mass.
1891); Zurich Gen. Accident & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Childs Co., 171 N.E. 391, 392 (N.Y. 1930).
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prepared to exercise its coercive regulatory authority by forcing her into, or
redefining, such relationships.
Second, consent is instrumental to economic efficiency, a cherished value
in American culture. According to neoclassical theory, which continues to
dominate most academic thinking, a transaction increases one's welfare (and
indirectly, social welfare) only when it results from one's informed, voluntary
choice to engage in the transaction, or when it accurately mimics the choice
that one would have made under those ideal conditions. Ordinarily, these
transactions are effected and choices satisfied through markets.
A third foundation for consent in American law more generally is our
abiding, almost obsessive suspicion of state power. Even today, sixty years
after the New Deal established the structure of the administrative state,
American political culture still presumes that the most legitimate ground for
binding individuals is their consent to the transaction. As a matter of political
rhetoric, the state may overcome this presumption in favor of private ordering
only by explicitly justifying the intrusion of public law.'
The Supreme Court drew together these three threads of informed
consent-.-individual autonomy, economic efficiency, and anti-statism-in its
famous 1905 decision, Lochner v. New York,6 in which the Court invalidated
a state law prescribing maximum hours and working conditions for bakery
employees. The Due Process Clause, the Court held, proscribed state law limits
on employers' and employees' liberty of contract, understood as their mutual,
voluntary consent to the terms of employment.7 Although the Court thereafter
jettisoned liberty of contract as a constitutional norm, the conception of
individual autonomy that Lochner sought to advance survives in a number of
public health contexts, such as federal regulation of research on human
subjects,9 mandated disclosures for patients whose care is financed under
federal programs, 0 and other statutorily required disclosures."
4. See generally PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 41 (14th ed. 1992)
("[Efficient exchanges] are made through voluntary exchange of goods for money at market prices .... ").
5. This presumption is revealed, for example, in the recent policy debates over the Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993) (amending 2 U.S.C. §§ 60m-60n (1988); 5
U.S.C. §§ 6381-6386 (1988); 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1988)). A major issue in the debates was whether
individual employers and employees should be coerced by the government into adopting leave arrangements
to which one or both did not consent. See, e.g., Helen Dewar, Senate Panel Relaunches Family Leave
Legislation, WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 1991, at AI3.
6. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
7. Id. at 52-65.
8. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding Fair Labor Standards Act); West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding minimum wage legislation); NLRB v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding National Labor Relations Act).
9. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.116-46.117 (1992) (describing mandated disclosures and documentation).
10. For example, the Public Health Service's program to grant states funds for substance abuse and
HIV early intervention requires states to provide informed consent to persons seeking early intervention
through such programs. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300x-24(b)(6)(A) (West Supp. 1993). Informed consent is also
required for care provided by the Veterans Health Administration. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7331 (West Supp. 1993).
Under the Patient Self-Determination Act, 42 U.S.C.S. § 1396a(w) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993), hospitals and
nursing homes must inform their patients whether their states allow the cessation of treatment should they
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When Americans think of informed consent, however, they probably think
of consent to risks of personal injury from medical treatment and from
exposure to dangerous products. In these contexts, informed consent does not
simply pursue the contract law goals of individual autonomy, efficiency, and
anti-statism; it also advances two related ideas, fault and duty, that pervade and
moralize tort law. These ideas, which took root and flourished during the
heyday of traditional liberalism in the nineteenth century, 2 hold that as long
as one who suffers harm consents (in some legally meaningful sense) to bear
the risk that leads to it, the injurer is not under a duty to protect the victim and
is not at fault if an injury occurs. 13 By relieving the injurer of a duty to the
victim and negating the injurer's fault-in effect, replacing the negligence
standard of care applicable to the injurer's actions with a new, less demanding
standard-informed consent absolves her of tort liability.'4 Informed consent
claims arise at the private law intersection of torts and contracts, the laws
which govern most workaday activities and choices. It is here that the social
meaning of consent becomes most evident.
The doctrine of informed consent in health care 5 shared in the more
general expansion of American tort liability that proceeded well into the 1980's
and that now appears to have stabilized. 16 Everyone, it seems, favors the
become incapacitated. Care centers must provide written information regarding patient rights, living wills,
and proxy decisionmaking authorized by state law. The law covers all centers that receive funding under
Medicare or Medicaid. Leonard Sloane, '91 Law Says Failing Patients Must Be Told of Their Options, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 8, 1990, at 50.
Federal law also requires all states to adopt the Center for Disease Control guidelines (or their
equivalent) regarding transmission of HilV during invasive medical procedures. Under these guidelines,
physicians who are HIV+ must consult expert review panels before performing surgery, and those panels
may mandate disclosure to patients. Pub. L. No. 102-141, § 633, 105 Stat. 834, 876-77 (1991). See
generally Jeffrey W. Cavender, Note, AIDS in the Health Care Setting: The Congressional Response to the
Kimberly Bergalis Case, 26 GA. L. REV. 539 (1992). Some states have also enacted mandatory disclosure
measures. See, e.g., Mark D. Johnson, Comment, HIV Testing of Health Care Workers: Conflict Between
the Common Law and the Centers for Disease Control, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 479, 533-35 (1993).
11. For example, informed consent principles are resurging in the environmental context in the form
of such programs as the Toxic Release Inventory and a labelling requirement on international transport of
hazardous waste, see ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND
POLICY 1203-04 (1992), as well as in an emphasis on consumer product labelling. Id. at 121-22, 131-32.
12. Compare MORTON HORWFr'Z, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 (1977) with
Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE
L.J. 1717 (1981) [hereinafter Gary Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy]. Although Schwartz finds the
law of this period more hospitable to liability than Horwitz does, he does not dispute the claim that fault
and duty were important limitations on liability.
13. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 18, 68 (5th ed.
1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
14. The relationship between the concepts of duty and fault is clearer at the conceptual level than at
the operational level. The operational confusion is evidenced by the difficulty of "merging" all or part of
the assumed risk defense into a comparative fault regime. See infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
15. This Article is concerned with informed consent in treatment decisions, not in clinical research
settings. For a general discussion of the latter, see ROBERT J. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF
CLINICAL RESEARCH (2d ed. 1986); Robert J. Levine, Informed Consent in Research and Practice:
Similarities and Differences, 143 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1229 (1983).
16. This expansion was most apparent in products liability, see, e.g., George L. Priest, The Current
Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521 (1987) [hereinafter Priest, Current Insurance
Crisis], but it was not confined to that area, see Gary T. Schwartz, The Vitality of Negligence and the
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principle of informed consent; it is "only" the specific details and applications
of the doctrine that arouse serious debate. In order to map and enlarge this
debate, it is useful to distinguish three different versions of informed consent
doctrine. The first is the letter and spirit of the doctrine as developed primarily
by courts-the law "in books." The second is the doctrine as imagined, feared,
and often caricatured by some physicians-the law "in the mind." The third
version, a consequence both of the gap between the first two and of other
situational constraints, is the doctrine as actually practiced by clinicians-the
law "in action."17 (Of course, there are almost as many laws-in-action as there
are distinct physician-patient relationships.)
Most commentators on informed consent deploy one or more of these
versions of the law. Generally (and crudely) speaking, these commentators fall
into two camps: idealists and realists. Informed consent idealists-primarily
some judges and medical ethicists-advocate a relatively expansive conception
of the physician's obligation to disclose and elicit information about risks and
alternatives.' 8 More specifically, the idealists tend to define informed consent
law's pivotal concepts-materiality of risk, disclosure, alternatives, and
causation-broadly and subjectively from the perspective of the individual
patient rather than that of the professional, while defining the law's exceptions
to the duty narrowly.'9 Perhaps most important, idealists emphasize the
qualitative dimension of physician-patient interactions concerning treatment
decisions. They insist that these interactions be dialogic rather than
authoritative, tailored to the individual patient's emotional needs and cognitive
capacities rather than formulaic, aimed at maximizing patient autonomy and
comprehension rather than mere information flow, and sensitive to the
distortions that can be created by power differentials between physician and
patient.
The idealists employ a distinctive rhetorical strategy. Capitalizing on the
universal support for the principles and goals of informed consent, they point
to the often striking difference between the law in books and the law in
action-a difference that I call the "informed consent gap." The existence of
this gap, they argue, shows that the law in action falls far short of the law in
Ethics of Strict Liability, 15 GA. L. REv. 963 (1981). The pattern of stabilization is discussed in Gary T.
Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REv.
601 (1992) [hereinafter Gary Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End]; see also James A.
Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An Empirical Study of
Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REV. 479 (1990) [hereinafter Henderson & Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution]
and Theodore Eisenberg & James A. Henderson, Jr., Inside the Quiet Revolution in Products Liability, 39
UCLA L. RnV. 735 (1992) [hereinafter Eisenberg & Henderson, Inside the Quiet Revolution].
17. Roscoe Pound first drew the distinction between the law in action and the law in books. Roscoe
Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910).
18. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (principle of informed
consent requires that physician disclose information that reasonable patient would wish to know in making
treatment decisions); Truman v. Thomas, 611 P2d 902, 906-07 (Cal. 1980) (patient must be apprised of
risks of not undergoing treatment, even if she has refused treatment); see also KATZ, supra note 1, at 48-84.
19. The law of informed consent is summarized infra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
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books. Since the law that they think should be in the books is often even more
demanding, the true gap is wider still. The problem, then, is not so much the
law in books, which tends to demand too little of physicians; rather, it is the
laws in action and in the mind. For the idealist, therefore, the goal of reform
must be to close the informed consent gap by conforming the law in action,
at the very least, to the law now in books.
The realists-primarily practicing physicians-harbor a different vision of
informed consent.2° Although they emphatically do not contest the principle
and goals of informed consent, they do question whether most patients really
desire the kind of dialogue that the idealists propose. They also question
whether, whatever patients desire, the gains in patient autonomy and improved
outcomes produced by the dialogue are worth the additional time, money, and
needless patient anxiety and confusion that informed consent may entail. Like
the idealists, many realists employ a characteristic rhetoric. Rather than master
the doctrinal details of the informed consent law in books, they point instead
to the law in their minds, which they can easily caricature in order to
demonstrate the law's folly. Although some realists do not concede that the
law in action actually deviates from the law in their minds, many others
readily admit that a gap does in fact exist. To them, however, this gap simply
demonstrates how impractical the idealists' vision is and why it cannot be
implemented in the demanding world of contemporary clinical practice.2 '
In a real sense, then, informed consent idealists and realists argue past one
another, producing a debate that is oblique and inconclusive rather than pointed
and fruitful. For several related reasons, it is time to revisit this debate. These
reasons include the intense public concern about rising health care costs, the
bureaucratization of the physician-patient relationship, and the organization of
health care delivery into units with some degree of market power over
providers. Is the informed consent gap to be deplored or tolerated? Should
physicians' legal obligations to disclose be further expanded, retained in their
present form, or reduced? I approach these questions in part by asking what
can be learned by comparing informed consent doctrine in other areas of
personal injury law, especially products liability, with the doctrine applicable
to the health care setting ("informed consent proper"). I ask how cost-
effective22 informed consent doctrine is in practice, and in that connection, I
ask whether it is as sensitive as it should be to the different clinical contexts
20. Perhaps the most articulate of the realists is Dr. Thomas P. Duffy. See Thomas P. Duffy,
Agamemnon's Fate and the Medical Profession, 9 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 21 (1987) (reviewing and
criticizing Jay Katz's approach). Dr. Sherwin Nuland advances a more moderate realist position in his
forthcoming book. See SHERWIN B. NULAND, How WE DIE: REFLECTIONS ON LFE's FINAL CHAPTER 258-
61, 265-67 (forthcoming 1994) (distinguishing, inter alia, between family physicians, who can and should
engage in meaningful informed consent dialogue with patients, and specialists, who cannot realistically be
expected to do so).
21. NULAND, supra note 20, at 258-61, 265-67; Duffy, supra note 20, at 24.
22. See infra note 23.
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in which it arises. The answers to such questions, I hope, will refocus the
debate and enable us to reconsider the utility of the doctrine in its present
form.
I conclude that the problem of the informed consent gap is essentially
structural-that is, it reflects the constraints imposed by human psychology,
the physician-patient relationship, the tort law system, and an increasingly cost-
conscious health care delivery system-and that these constraints are largely
intractable. I therefore doubt that the idealists' most ambitious goals are
desirable, since they cannot likely be attained at any socially acceptable cost.
I am doubtful because, although I find reasons to think that the idealists are
wrong, I am not yet as convinced of their error as some realists appear to be.
The truth is that no one has yet undertaken the kind of research and analysis,
much of it empirical and perhaps comparative, that would be necessary to
resolve these doubts conclusively. By explaining the basis for these concerns,
proposing how this analytical challenge might be approached, and suggesting
certain improvements that can probably be made at a modest cost, I hope to
help close the informed consent gap.
Part II places the legal idea of consent in historical and doctrinal context,
discussing its role in tort law generally, and in two subfields of tort law:
products liability and informed consent proper (i.e., in health care). The
discussion concerns the law in books.
Part M is comparative in nature. It focuses on the similarities and
differences between informed consent proper and its analogues in products
liability law and tort law more generally. It argues that the doctrine of
informed consent proper is in most respects more onerous to risk creators than
in these other areas. I then consider five plausible arguments that might justify
the different burdens that the law imposes on potential tortfeasors to engage
in a dialogue with foreseeable victims. These arguments proceed from claims
about autonomy, relational continuity, conflict of interest, inequality of
information and bargaining power, and, finally, utility. Scrutinizing these five
arguments from this comparative perspective, I conclude that none of them
satisfactorily explains the disparity in dialogic burden, although the argument
from information inequality probably comes closest.
Part IV begins by emphasizing the growing public demand for health care
cost containment, noting that these pressures underscore the importance of
reassessing the appropriate contours of informed consent. This reconsideration,
I suggest, should proceed along four different paths.
First, informed consent doctrine should be subjected to an analysis of its
cost-effectiveness" that is as systematic as this elusive, value-laden subject
23. For policies like informed consent whose benefits are especially difficult to measure and compare
to costs, cost-effectiveness is often a more useful decision-making criterion than cost-benefit analysis. See
EDITH STOKEY & RICHARD ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 153-55 (1978).
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permits. A cost-effectiveness analysis accepts the undeniably attractive goals
of informed consent law in books (as I and virtually all other commentators
on the subject do) and asks whether they can be achieved more fully, more
cheaply, or both. It focuses attention on the costs and benefits of the far
different and rather less inspiring regime of informed consent in action, on
other possible regimes, and hence on the changes in clinical practice that must
occur if the goals of the law in books are to be achieved.
Second, providers should alter the way in which they characterize and
communicate treatment (and nontreatment) risks to patients so that the
information will be more meaningful, accurate, and useful. Specifically, I urge
that physicians begin to describe risks in comparative terms so that patients
can view these risks in light of other, more familiar ones that they face in daily
life. Only then can they appraise these risks in a sophisticated, autonomy-
enhancing way.
A third path emphasizes the contingency and contextuality of perception
and meaning.24 The significance of consent to an individual, and to the society
that must decide whether to give effect to it, depends on the circumstances in
which it is elicited. Much the same can be said of people's perceptions and
attitudes about risk. This fact has important implications for assessing what is
now a quite monolithic informed consent doctrine in health care. If that
doctrine is to become more sensitive to the various contexts in which it is
applied, it must become more highly differentiatedY which would in turn
make the doctrine more refined and presumably more cost-effective.
Finally, the law should foster this kind of differentiation by facilitating and
enforcing explicit contracts between providers and patient groups about the
desired characteristics of informed consent. A contract strategy is already
practicable in some settings and will become more universally so as national
health reforms organize patients into larger, more sophisticated, and more
consumer-oriented health care purchasing units-a prospect that in broad terms
seems inevitable.
All of these goals share a common theme: the need to contextualize
informed consent. Contextualization would advance the aim of cost-
effectiveness and would also be desirable in its own right. Each goal seeks to
improve the informed consent dialogue, and the doctrine that regulates it, by
tailoring the law's requirements more carefully to the different settings in
which risks arise and are discussed, assessed, and acted upon.
24. This notion is well established in the psychology literature. See, e.g., JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY].
25. The optimal level of differentiation that a legal doztrine should seek is a separate question. See
infra note 216 and accompanying text.
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II. CONSENT IN CONTEMPORARY TORT LAW
A. Historical Context
Few legal ideas are more sensitive to evolving social conditions and values
than consent. According to legal historian Morton Horwitz, private law's view
of consent has changed radically as new economic and social conditions have
altered power relationships and reshaped legal doctrine.26 While some
scholars dispute Horwitz's claim that the scope of consent-based defenses
expanded greatly during the nineteenth century,27 most would agree that the
courts have narrowed these defenses in recent decades, a trend that has
contributed to the general growth of liability (especially tort liability) during
this period. Torts scholars have found that courts became increasingly reluctant
to dismiss personal injury claims on the ground that the victims consented to
the injury-causing risks; in particular, the courts strongly disfavored consent-
based defenses such as assumption of the risk and product warning.28 The
reasons for this trend are uncertain. Some scholars have attributed it to the
courts' desire to use expansive tort liability as a system of risk distribution and
insurance.29 Others have pointed to a more general anti-market public policy
mentality that prevailed during the 1960's and early 1970's, when much of this
liability expansion occurred.3"
Tvo developments have rendered somewhat paradoxical this expansion of
tort law and its intrusion into contract law, the realm of mutual consent. First,
26. In its most general terms, Horwitz's thesis holds that prior to the middle of the 19th century, state
courts developed a number of doctrines that in effect relieved individuals of the adverse consequences of
choices for which the courts felt they should not in fairness be held responsible. In contract law, the courts
fashioned liberal defenses of duress, unconscionability, incompetence, and others designed to protect
individuals whom the courts thought were in relatively weak bargaining positions; their formal consent was
deemed uninformed, involuntary, or otherwise unauthentic. With industrialization, however, the courts
sought to protect capitalist enterprise from the uncertainties and burdens imposed by these doctrines by
adopting a more formalistic, laissez-faire, objectivist view of consent. Horwitz discerns a similar pattern
in tort law, where courts that had previously protected personal injury victims through narrow
interpretations of the traditional consent-based defenses to liability began during the Industrial Revolution
to broaden these defenses with the goal of subsidizing risky enterprises. HORWITZ, supra note 12, at 201-
10, 253; HORWrT, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960, at 13-14 (1992).
27. Horwitz's view has been severely criticized on the contracts side, A.W.B. Simpson, The Horwitz
Thesis and the History of Contracts, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 542 (1979) ("TIThe changes [Horwitz]
describes were not the changes that occurred.. . . [M]any of the doctrines that he identifies as characteristic
of the transformation were common in the eighteenth century."), and on the torts side, Gary Schwartz, Tort
Law and tie Economy, supra note 12, at 1772-73. Schwartz notes that the assumed risk defense in the
employment context was an exception to "the general tendency toward victim protectiveness." Id. at 1771.
28. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, at 493-94. According to a leading historian of tort law, this
defense "seemed just about extinct" by 1980. Gary Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End, supra
note 16, at 671.
29. See, e.g., PETER HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988);
Priest, Current Insurance Crisis, supra note 16, at 1524-25.
30. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, The New Judicial Ideology of Tort Law, in NEw DIRECTIONS IN
LIABILITY LAW 4, 6-8 (Walter Olson ed., 1988) [hereinafter NEW DIRECTIONS]; Gary Schwartz, The
Beginning and the Possible End, supra note 16, at 615-20.
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the rise of one kind of contract, third-party ("liability") insurance, helped to
facilitate the "death of contract" in other areas of the law.3' Liability
insurance, by encouraging courts concerned with risk spreading to develop
doctrines conducive to that goal, enabled tort plaintiffs to reach the "deep
pockets"--insurers, the ultimate risk spreaders-more easily. Moreover, this
liability-expanding effect of insurance occurred during a period when private
and social insurance coverage for illness, disability, and wage loss, which
might have been expected to reduce the scope and significance of tort liability,
was also growing dramatically.
32
The second paradoxical development is tort law's displacement of contract
in areas of commercial activity in which explicit contracts already exist and
contract principles have traditionally governed legal relationships almost
exclusively. These are also areas in which the argument that insurance
considerations should affect liability is often especially weak-because, for
example, both parties are good loss-spreaders. Indeed, tort law's most striking
growth has been in products liability, an area in which plaintiffs and
defendants interact as arm's-length buyers and sellers in an explicitly
commercial context that provides a full set of well-developed contract
remedies. A less dramatic development, but one more pertinent to this Article,
is tort law's expansion in the health care setting (as in medical malpractice and
informed consent law) at the very same time that important changes in the
nature and institutional setting of the provider-patient relationship were making
contract more suitable than tort as a legal regime for regulating those
relationships.
33
Tort law has largely eclipsed consent-contract approaches to the problem
of health-care-related injuries. No-fault compensation systems, which might
have slowed this development by displacing tort law to some extent, have
instead found little political support in the United States. The movement
toward mandatory no-fault compensation systems, which began with workers'
compensation almost a century ago and once seemed like the wave of the
future,' stalled during the 1970's and has hardly progressed since then.35
31. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 87-94 (1974) (describing growing use of tort-like
doctrines, such as promissory estoppel, to expand liability beyond scope of traditional contract law).
32. For the growth of first-party insurance and its overlap with tort liability, see Jeffrey O'Connell,
Must Health and Disability Insurance Subsidize Wasteful Injury Suits?, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 1055, 1059-61
(1989); see also DEBORAH HENSLER ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE UNITED
STATES 102-08 (1991).
33. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
34. See Jeremiah Smith, Sequel to Workmen's Compensation Acts, 27 HARV. L. REV. 344, 365 (1914)
("Whether [no fault] legislation of the above descriptions ought to be enacted is a question upon which no
opinion is here intimated. Our immediate point is, that the present Workmen's Compensation legislation
will inevitably give rise to a plausible agitation for such further legislation.").
35. In the most important area of accidents, motor vehicle injuries, federal no-fault legislation was
decisively defeated during the 1970's. Robert L. Rabin, Some Reflections on the Process of Tort Reform,
25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 13, 19-22 (1988). Moreover, almost all of the state programs that exist are
essentially "add-ons" to the tort system rather than genuine no-fault plans. See, e.g., Roger S. Clark &
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In addition, contractual no-fault plans in which individuals agree in advance
with risk creators to waive or limit their tort claims in return for an assured
no-fault recovery in the event of injury have not been widely adopted. 6 As
for contractual no-fault, courts have been inhospitable to waivers of potential
tort claims, often refusing to enforce them. This has been especially true in the
area of health care.37
During the 1980's, however, proponents of consent-contract approaches to
personal injuries launched a strong counterattack. In books, articles, and
legislative proposals, consent-contract advocates drew on theoretical arguments
grounded in law-and-economics principles, and on policy arguments grounded
in the high transaction costs and perverse consequences of the tort system.
These reformers urged legislatures and courts, among other things, to
reinvigorate the assumed risk and product warning defenses, and to enforce
informed, consensual risk allocations designed to contract around the tort
system.38 As the next Section demonstrates, their efforts have not yet enjoyed
much success.
B. Doctrinal Context
I shall discuss three major doctrinal domains of American personal injury
law in which the idea of informed consent is embedded.39 They are (1) tort
Gerald E. Waterson, "No-Fault" in Delaware, 6 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 225 (1974) (discussing Delaware's add-on
plan). In the area of medical malpractice, mandatory no-fault has received little serious legislative
consideration. For a summary of recent developments, see MARC A. FRANKuN & ROBERT L. RABIN, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 783-87 (5th ed. 1992). The trial bar has played an
important role in the defeat of no-fault legislation. See, e.g., JEFFREY O'CONNELL & C. BRIAN KELLY, THE
BLAME GAME: INJURIES, INSURANCE, AND INJUSTICE 117-18 (1987); Jeffrey O'Connell et al., Consumer
Choice in the Auto Insurance Market, 52 MD. L. REv. (forthcoming 1994); IV. John Moore, Trial Lawyers
on Trial, 22 NAT'L. J. 2962 (1990).
36. These are sometimes called "neo-no-fault" by their principal advocate, Jeffrey O'Connell, who has
designed many such systems to cover accidents in a wide variety of settings such as health care delivery,
school athletics, product injuries, and governmentally caused injuries. See, e.g., Jeffrey O'Connell, Neo-No-
Fault: A Fair-Exchange Proposal for Tort Reform, in NEv DIRECTIONS, supra note 30, at 186 [hereinafter
O'Connell, Neo-No-Fault]; see also Jeffrey O'Connell, A "Neo No-Fault" Contract in Lieu of Tort: Pre-
Accident Guarantees of Postaccident Settlement Offers, 73 CAL. L. REV. 898 (1985) (discussing forums
which have adopted "neo-no-fault" programs and how such programs have been received).
37. See infra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
38. RICHARD EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW 147-51 (1980) (proposing enforcement of
consensual liability limits in certain well-defined circumstances); Alan Schwartz et al., Encouraging
Contractual Alternatives to Tort, in 2 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY FOR
PRODUCT RELATED INJURIES: PROPOSED FINAL REPORT, COUNCIL DRAFT # 1, at 581 (1990) [hereinafter
Alan Schwartz, Encouraging Alternatives] (same); O'Connell, Neo-No-Fault, supra note 36 (same). In
1985, Senators John Danforth and David Durenberger submitted legislation based on O'Connell's scheme
to reform the medical malpractice tort system. 131 CONG. REC. 36,870 (1985). Their proposal was not
enacted. See also PAUL H. RUBIN, TORT REFORM BY CONTRACT (1993); HUBER, supra note 29, at 220-24
(criticizing courts' rejection of consent-based defenses to tort liability); George L. Priest, A Theory of the
Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297, 1347-49 (1981) (criticizing courts' rewriting of product
warranties) [hereinafter Priest, Consumer Product Warranty].
39. Other areas not discussed here include the settlement of tort claims, see, e.g., Hume v. Moore-
McCormack Lines, Inc., 121 F.2d 336 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 684 (1941) (release of tort claims
signed by seaman not valid with respect to disease of which he was unaware at the time), and workers'
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law generally, which introduces informed consent through the assumed risk
defense; (2) products liability law, which introduces it through the concept of
warning defect; and (3) what I have called informed consent proper, the
doctrine as applied to the health care treatment setting. I shall briefly discuss
the first two here; the third is the subject of Part II. This doctrinal review
reveals that a health care provider's obligations toward patients are in several
respects more onerous than those that other actors owe to potential victims and
those that product manufacturers and sellers owe to their purchasers and
consumers. The comparative analysis that follows in Part II calls into question,
although it does not flatly reject, the justification for imposing this greater
burden on health care providers.
1. Tort Law Generally
In tort law, the risk assumptions that may defeat a victim's liability claim
can be either express or implied. In express assumption of risk situations, the
victim has, prior to the accident, expressly agreed to release a potential injurer
from tort liability for specified (or all) injuries that the victim might sustain in
connection with certain activities. The agreement can take the form of a
signed, highly explicit waiver of possible tort claims contained in a written
contract, as when one rents skis or a whitewater canoe. At the other end of the
explicitness spectrum, the agreement can take the form of a printed waiver that
appears in small print on the back of a ticket stub issued by a parking lot or
movie theater.40 Legislatures often prohibit and courts often invalidate the
latter kind of agreement as a matter of public policy. Stigmatizing this type of
waiver as a contract of adhesion, they emphasize the consumer's lack of
bargaining power, alternatives, risk information, and awareness of the
waiver-in essence, her lack of informed consent to the risk.4'
compensation law, which excludes claims deriving from conduct that is either, depending on the
jurisdiction's statute, intentional or reckless, see generally ARTHUR LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION
LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT 449-88 (1984). By stretching the notion of worker consent, one can
think of these categories as tantamount to a recognition that the worker can consent to her own injury.
Analogous defenses usually exist in other no-fault systems. See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 5103(b) (MeKinney
1985) (automobile no-fault).
40. Compare Garretson v. United States, 456 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1972) (barring claim of experienced
skier who signed entry blank for ski tournament containing conspicuous release) with Baker v. City of
Seattle, 484 P.2d 405 (Wash. 1971) (en bane) (voiding as contrary to public policy one-sentence
exculpatory clause buried in midst of other terms of golf-cart rental agreement).
41. See, e.g., Wagenblast v. Odessa Sch. Dist. No. 105-157-166J, 758 P.2d 968, 971 (Wash. 1988)
(using six factors named in Tunkl v. Regents of University of California, 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963), to
invalidate requirement that students wishing to participate in interscholastic sports had to waive negligence
claims against school district); Henrioulle v. Marin Ventures, Inc., 573 P.2d 465 (Cal. 1978) (invalidating
lease that included general release of owner from negligence actions). For examples of state legislation, see
N.Y. GEN. OBLUG. LAW §§ 5-321 to 5-326 (Consol. 1977). For an example of federal legislation providing
for special scrutiny of waivers of certain liability claims, see Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, 29
U.S.C.S. § 626(0 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
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Of greater interest here, however, is the tendency of courts to override
explicit waivers even when the consumer's attention is called to the risk and
she makes a conscious choice to accept the risk with some knowledge of the
danger. This tendency is especially pronounced in the health care treatment
setting, where courts have made it almost impossible to design enforceable
risk-sharing agreements between consumers and providers.42
In this genre, the leading case is Tunkl v. Regents of University of
California.43 In Tunkl, the California Supreme Court invalidated a waiver
clause in a hospital admission form. The court emphasized six factors
justifying its action: (1) health care is a business "generally thought suitable
for public regulation"; (2) the hospital was performing a service necessary to
the public; (3) the hospital held itself out as willing to perform this service for
any member of the public; (4) the hospital had greater bargaining strength than
the consumer; (5) the waiver form was an adhesion contract which did not
permit consumers to purchase more protection if they chose; and (6) the
hospital controlled the risk of injury and could be negligent. The TunkI
approach of examining the circumstances surrounding execution of the waiver
and construing it very narrowly has been extended to other health care settings.
In a recent New York case, for example, the court invalidated an agreement
by a dental patient to waive tort claims in exchange for receiving care from
supervised graduate students at a university clinic. His private dentist had
urged him to contact the clinic, which agreed to perform the needed service for
less than half the ordinary fee."
Assumption of risk may also be implied. Here, one's alleged consent is not
expressed through execution of a signed document or acceptance of a receipt
reciting the consent as a condition of service; instead, defendants argue that
consent is implicit in the relationship between the parties and in the plaintiff's
behavior and understandings. The common law of industrial accidents, before
it was supplanted by workers' compensation statutes, provides the classic
example of implied assumption of risk.45
Today, however, most courts and legislatures evince considerable hostility
to the defense of implied assumption of risk. The dominant approach has been
42. These court decisions did not involve informed consent proper. See generally Clark C. Havighurst,
Private Reform of Tort-Law Dogma: Market Opportunities and Legal Obstacles, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Spring 1986, at 143 (discussing courts' reluctance to uphold exculpatory clauses for medical malpractice
and pointing to some reform possibilities).
43. 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963). See generally CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE LAW AND POLICY
903-04 (1988) (discussing cases where such agreements have been invalidated).
44. Ash v. New York Univ. Dental Ctr., 564 N.Y.S.2d 308 (App. Div. 1990); see also Emory Univ.
v. Porubiansky, 282 S.E.2d 903 (Ga. 1981) (holding that exculpatory clause in contract did not relieve
dental clinic of duty of reasonable care). In a recent case not involving a health care provider, the Supreme
Court of Washington invalidated an agreement in which parents of schoolchildren waived liability claims
against the school for injuries from after-school sports activities, even though the decision might result in
the elimination of the sports program. Wagenblast, 758 P.2d at 968.
45. See generally JOSEPH V. LrTTLE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON WORKERS' COMPENSATION
16-17 (3d ed. 1993).
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to eliminate or narrow the defense, thereby facilitating plaintiffs' recoveries.46
This narrowing is usually accomplished by "merging" the implied assumption
of risk doctrine, in whole or in part,47 into comparative fault, a doctrine that
has itself been broadened from the traditional contributory negligence concept
in order to increase recoveries.4' Because a plaintiff's comparative fault
merely reduces her recovery pro tanto while assumed risk is ordinarily a
complete defense, this merger does not fully immunize defendants from
liability for risks to which the victim in fact consented. Hence, the merger of
assumed risk into comparative fault renders informed consent somewhat less
effective, but not wholly irrelevant.
In the United States, an important institutional feature of implied
assumption of risk is that courts consider the defense to be an issue of fact for
the jury to decide. Precisely because it is a jury question, the application of the
implied assumption of risk doctrine is shaped by evolving social norms
concerning fundamental issues of morality: the meaning of fairness, reciprocity
in relationships, the extent of free will, individual responsibility for choice, and
the like. It is in this sense that implied assumption of risk, notwithstanding its
ostensible and legally institutionalized character as a "fact," is in reality a
culturally constructed and highly normative doctrine, one that is highly
responsive to changing social values.
Recent judicial decisions underscore the plasticity of the assumed risk
doctrine-and, thus, that of the underlying informed consent principle.
Decisions by the Supreme Court of California in particular could portend a
reversal of the strong judicial trend of narrowing the ambit of the assumed risk
doctrine.49 A number of recent decisions in California and elsewhere have
allowed the assumption of risk defense in cases of recreational injuries. 50 This
apparent revival of interest in informed consent as a limitation on liability has
46. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, at 493-95.
47. Sometimes the merger is complete and assumption of risk is wholly eliminated as a defense. In
other situations, however, only "unreasonable" assumptions of risk are merged into comparative fault, in
which case "reasonable" assumption of risk remains as a defense independent of comparative fault. See id.
at 495-98.
48. Id.
49. Of course, it is still too early to tell. See Gail D. Cox, Assumption of Risks, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 28,
1991, at 1, 24-25. The meaning of consent in other contexts, such as rape cases, is also highly
controversial. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Taking Sexual Autonomy Seriously: Rape Law and Beyond,
11 LAW & PHIL. 35, 76-77 (1992) (arguing that consent requires clear expression of positive willingness);
Steven B. Katz, Expectation and Desire in the Law of Forcible Rape, 26 SAN DiEGo L. REV. 21, 21 (1989)
(noting that law constructs and assumes women's consent); Lucy R. Harris, Comment, Towards a Consent
Standard in the Law of Rape, 43 U. CHL. L. REv. 613, 613-14 (1976) (arguing that consent in rape law
should conform to consent in other legal areas). For a related critique of the notion of consent, see Robin
West, Authority, Autonomy & Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and Political Visions of Franz
Kafka & Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384 (1985).
50. See, e.g., Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992) (using assumption of risk doctrine to bar
claim of player injured in touch football game); Turcotte v. Fell, 502 N.E.2d 964 (N.Y. 1986) (using
assumption of risk doctrine to bar jockey's suit against racetrack owner); see also FOWLER V. HARPER Er
AL., THE LAW OF ToRTs § 21.0 n.16 (2d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1993); Gary Schwartz, The Beginning and the
Possible End, supra note 16, at 672 nn.377-80.
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not yet been applied to injuries incurred at the hands of health care providers,
but it could spread to them.
In light of the discussions of products liability and informed consent
proper that follow, one other feature of the assumed risk doctrine should be
emphasized. In contrast to product suppliers and health care providers
(informed consent proper), actors who are governed by tort law are generally
under no statutorily or judicially imposed obligation to warn their potential
victims about, much less affirmatively obtain their consent to, risks of injury.
In order to relieve the injurer of liability, it is enough that the victim
encountered the risk with the requisite knowledge and voluntariness. Indeed,
actors governed by tort law generally need not communicate about the risk at
all; the defense will still apply so long as the victim consents, in this sense, to
encounter it.
2. Products Liability
The law of sales traditionally governed the liability of product distributors
for product-related injuries; products liability in tort was historically a
backwater, generating relatively few cases, slow doctrinal change, and little
public attention.5' This situation changed beginning in California in the early
1960's.52 Doctrinal innovation in the area spread to other states in succeeding
decades,53 as strict liability for defective products became the regnant
doctrine, eclipsing sales law and negligence as the remedies of choice for
injured consumers. 4 The expansion of products liability doctrine was dramatic,
continuing well into the 1980's, when (according to some recent analyses) it
began to contract 5 or at least stabilize. 6
Informed consent is a crucial limitation on products liability. Here it is
imbedded in the warning defect doctrine; if the product fails adequately to
warn the purchaser (or ultimate consumer) about the product's risks, courts
deem the product to be "defective" and hold the distributor liable for injuries
51. See, e.g., George L. Priest, Strict Products Liability: The Original Intent, 10 CARDOZO L. REV.
2301, 2305-17 (1989).
52. The seminal cases were Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963)
(establishing strict liability for manufacturers of defective products), Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391
P.2d 168 (Cal. 1964) (establishing strict liability for distributors of defective products), and Elmore v.
American Motors Corp., 451 P.2d 84 (Cal. 1969) (holding that bystanders can recover for injury caused
by product defect under strict liability theory).
53. These developments are summarized in Gary T. Schwartz, Directions in Contemporary Products
Liability Scholarship, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 763 (1985).
54. See generally George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the
Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985). Priest's premise of "near
absolute" corporate liability is explicitly rejected by Gary Schwartz, who finds that negligence remains the
standard of liability in many important areas of tort law and that even strict liability for defective products
is not as strict as Priest's work sometimes suggests. Gary Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End,
supra note 16, at 621-33.
55. Henderson & Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution, supra note 16, at 489-98.
56. Gary Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End, supra note 16, at 603.
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caused by those risks. In effect, an adequate warning conclusively establishes
that the plaintiff assumed the risk. As a practical matter, even product labels
that contain a great deal of pertinent risk information-indeed, more than most
consumers are likely to read or assimilate-can easily fail the negligence
standard by which a court and jury measure the warning's adequacy. To courts
and juries, the cost of supplying additional label information appears
negligible, amounting to the cost of ink and paper, while the cost of injuries
that the information might avert is significant. An alternate possibility-that
more information may actually produce less comprehension, perhaps even
leading to more injuries-is more subtle and difficult to prove. Under these
circumstances, it is not surprising that product warning requirements became
more onerous.
57
Some courts and juries have demanded much more than mere "reasonable"
warnings. Some notorious decisions illustrate the expansiveness of many
interpretations of warning defect liability.5 8 Courts either found or permitted
juries to find warning defects in a vaccine producer's failure to warn of aone-
in-a-million risk of a serious side effect;59 a brewery's failure to warn that its
beer was unsafe if consumed in moderate quantities (ten to twelve cans per
week) for more than six years;6" a champagne bottler's failure to warn about
the release of pressure when removing the cork;6' a manufacturer's failure to
warn that a vehicle driven up too steep a slope could flip end-over-end; 62 a
warning not to use alcohol near a flame that did not warn also against use near
a pilot light;63 and a warning that birth control pills could cause death through
brain clotting but that failed to warn about death from stroke.' The New
Jersey Supreme Court went so far as to require that asbestos manufacturers
warn of hazards that were not reasonably knowable under the existing state of
knowledge and technology.
65
The problem of unrealistic warning requirements is in part endemic,
reflecting the kinds of product accidents that litigants bring to court. Alan
Schwartz has explained this phenomenon:
57. One commentator notes that a more restrictive "counter-trend" in warning doctrine emerged during
the 1980's. ld.
58. I do not suggest that these are representative of the larger universe of warning cases.
59. Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974).
60. Hon v. Stroh Brewery Co., 835 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1987).
61. Shuput v. Heublein, Inc., 511 F.2d 1104 (10th Cir. 1975).
62. Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 424 N.E.2d 568 (Ohio 1981).
63. Burch v. Amsterdam Corp., 366 A.2d 1079 (D.C. App. 1976).
64. MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 920
(1985).
65. Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539 (NJ. 1982). Responding to a chorus of
criticism, the court subsequently "restrict[ed] Beshada to the circumstances giving rise to its holding."
Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374, 388 (NJ. 1984). While the scope of this restriction is not entirely
clear, it presumably limits the Beshada principle to asbestos litigation. However, the court explicitly refused
to overrule Beshada. Id.; cf. Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 557 (Cal. 1991)
(holding that plaintiffs in all failure-to-warn actions, even in asbestos cases, must show that defendant knew
or should have known of the product risk).
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Initially, juries see only cases where a consumer is injured in
consequence of a malfunction against which the firm failed to warn
or is claimed to have warned inadequately. The jury never is told of
other possible malfunctions or asked to rank these by degree of
danger. Rather, the jury is asked to assess the firm's performance with
respect to the malfunction that actually happened. Thus, the jury
cannot know whether a firm's failure to warn was correct in light of
other risks that the product posed, or whether a warning that appears
too pallid ex post actually was correct because other risks were more
serious. This institutional system, therefore, creates poor incentives for
firms. They may respond by warning against malfunctions that have
been involved in litigation because not to do so invites punitive
damage claims, although these may pose the less-serious risks.
Alternatively, firms may try to warn against everything. Either
response reduces the efficacy of warnings against major risks: in the
former case, such warnings may not be given; in the latter, these
warnings may be lost in the clutter.66
Other doctrinal wrinkles have contributed to the expanded scope of
warning defect liability and hence of products liability. For example, a jury can
find a perfectly adequate label defective if it thinks that advertising for the
product undercut the label's efficacy as a warning,67 and a jury can find
defective a label that fully complied with a regulatory agency's safety labeling
requirements. 8 Perhaps most striking, some courts have helped plaintiffs to
meet the otherwise difficult burden of proving that a warning defect was also
a cause-in-fact of the injury-that is, that the injury would not have occurred
had the warning been adequate. In order to facilitate this proof, these courts
have adopted four presumptions: first, that the manufacturer knew all product-
related risks that could reasonably be known;69 second, that the manufacturer
could warn the consumer about these risks cheaply (again, largely the cost of
ink and paper); third, that consumers would actually read and comprehend an
adequate warning; and fourth, that if consumers had received an adequate
warning, they would have made a risk-minimizing choice-presumably without
regard to possible offsetting benefits.70 Each of these presumptions is
66. Alan Schwartz, The Case Against Strict Liability, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 819, 841 (1992). Schwartz
recommends that risks be ranked across products as well as for single products, and that warnings should
be measured according to the product's "global" ranking. Id.
67. See Hon v. Stroh Brewery Co., 835 F.2d 510, 514-15 (3d Cir. 1987) (recognizing that though risks
of beer drinking are arguably obvious, advertising linking consumption of eight to twelve cans of beer a
week with good health could nullify awareness of risks); Baldino v. Castagna, 478 A.2d 807, 810 (Pa.
1984) (holding that manufacturer's promotion of drug to physicians may nullify effect of its warnings). See
generally Martha K. Wivell & Daniel A. O'Fallon, Drug Overpromotion: When Is a Warning Not a
Iarning?, TRIAL, Nov. 1992, at 20 (discussing physicians' duty to warn patients of risks from prescription
drugs and effects of manufacturers' sales efforts on physicians).
68. Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 E2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
69. Some products liability decisions demand even more from the manufacturer. See, e.g., Beshada,
447 A.2d at 546-47 (finding product defective regardless of whether dangers were scientifically knowable).
70. See, e.g., Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 976 F2d 77, 80-81 (1st Cir. 1992); Coffman v. Keene Corp.,
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questionable. Several, especially the last two, are highly doubtful with respect
to product purchases; as we shall see in Part II, they are demonstrably false
with respect to most health care treatment decisions.
Expansive doctrines like these have aroused much criticism from legal
commentators. By the mid-1980's, courts began having second thoughts about
interpreting warning defect so broadly, and their rulings began to reflect these
misgivings.7 Nevertheless, some of the unrealistic, perhaps perverse demands
of informed consent in products liability that are implicit in the earlier product
warning decisions survive relatively undisturbed in the area of health care
treatment decisions, to which I now turn.
3. Informed Consent Proper
Physicians may not deal with their patients at arm's length; they owe their
patients a fiduciary duty, which includes an obligation to act exclusively in the
patient's interests and to disclose all information material to those interests. 2
In slightly over half the states, the legal standard for disclosure to patients is
that which a "reasonable medical practitioner" would provide.73 This
professionally defined standard is often that of the locality in which the
practitioner works, or a similar locality.74 The disclosure standard in most
other jurisdictions is that which would be sought by a prudent or reasonable
patient, a standard that emphasizes the value of patient autonomy over that of
professional judgment.75
The states vary in their rules concerning what information must be
disclosed. New York requires only that the practitioner provide information
about reasonably foreseeable risks and alternative treatments,76 while the new
628 A.2d 710, 716-24 (N.J. 1993). But see Thomas v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 949 F.2d 806 (5th Cir.
1992) (refusing to apply presumption for products with unavoidable risks). Indeed, some product misuse
decisions, by requiring manufacturers' warnings to anticipate consumers' abnormal uses, facilitate the causal
proof without the need to invoke this presumption. E.g., Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 495 A.2d 348
(Md. 1985) (ignition of nightgown worn inside out).
71. Henderson & Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution, supra note 16, at 488-98; Gary Schwartz, The
Beginning and the Possible End, supra note 16, at 666-67.
72. See generally Maxwell J. Mehlman, Fiduciary Contracting: Limitations on Bargaining Between
Patients and Health Care Providers, 51 U. PIT. L. REV. 365 (1990). For an interesting, recent application
of this fiduciary duty, see Moore v. Regents of University of California, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1388 (1991) (mandating disclosure of physician's research and financial interests in
patient's cells).
73. BARRY R. FURROW El AL., LIABILITY AND QUALITY ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE 337 (1991).
74. See, e.g., Chapel v. Allison, 785 P.2d 204, 210 (Mont. 1990) (holding non-board-certified general
practitioner to standard of care of a reasonably competent general practitioner acting in same or similar
community in United States); Henning v. Thomas, 366 S.E.2d 109, 112 (Va. 1988) (applying statewide
standard of care in medical malpractice case).
75. The landmark decision was Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See
generally Marjorie M. Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95
YALE L.J. 219 (1985).
76. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1993). Although the statute does not
expressly say so, the required disclosure includes the option of no treatment.
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Georgia statute requires disclosure of the nature of the treatment, any of
several specified risks, the likelihood of success, practical alternatives, and
prognosis if treatment is declined 77-- although even the most sophisticated
clinician may lack this level of knowledge, especially as it applies to her
individual patient. Increasingly, the disclosure is evidenced by a written
form signed by the patient prior to treatment, which recites both the risks
disclosed to her and her voluntary consent to treatment.79
Within these general principles, most informed consent litigation centers
around three issues. First, disputes arise concerning the physician's duty to
disclose all material risks, which most jurisdictions define in terms of the
reasonable foreseeability or medical significance of the risk. Courts sometimes
measure materiality according to the numeric probability of an adverse medical
outcome, but vary in the numerical standards that they employ.80 Courts have
not clarified whether the probabilities that the physician provides should refer
to the average risk to large populations or must instead refer to the risk to the
smallest group of which the patient is a member and for which the risk
information exists; the latter is far more relevant to the patient, but is also
more difficult for the physician to determine.
The Supreme Court of California addressed this question very recently in
a decision that is already controversial81 and that is likely to affect the
doctrine in other jurisdictions, given this court's influence in the informed
consent area. 2 In Arato v. Avedon,83 the court considered a claim by a
deceased pancreatic cancer victim's widow and children that his physicians'
failure to disclose information concerning the statistical life expectancy of
pancreatic cancer patients violated their duty to obtain his informed consent.'
77. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-6.1 (1991).
78. Telephone Interview with Dr. Ralph Horwitz, Professor of Medicine, Yale University School of
Medicine (May 11, 1993).
79. See infra note 189 and accompanying text.
80. Compare Yeates v. Harms, 393 P.2d 982, 991 (Kan. 1964) (not requiring disclosure of very small
chance of loss of eye) with Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299, 303 (Tex. 1967) (requiring disclosure of one
percent chance of loss of hearing). In a recent case, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that a surgeon
infected with the HIV might be negligent for having failed to inform patients of that condition before
operating on them, despite the absence of any documented instance of HIV transfer from surgeon to patient
in a sample of 4703 cases. The court emphasized that although the risk of transmission was "extremely
low," death was almost certain if transmission did occur. Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 333 (Md. 1993).
81. See Diane M. Gianelli, Ruling Sets Limit on Informed Consent, AM. MED. Nmvs, Nov. 1, 1993,
at 1 (citing criticisms of decision by some leading academic experts on informed consent).
82. Its seminal informed consent decisions include Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d I (Cal. 1972), Truman
v. Thomas, 611 P.2d 902 (Cal. 1980), and Moore v. Regents of University of California, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal.
1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1388 (1991). A lower court decision in California, Salgo v. Leland Stanford
Jr. Univ., 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957), was also quite influential.
83. 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 131 (1993).
84. The opinion fails to clarify precisely what the plaintiffs were claiming the physicians should have
disclosed. Three possibilities are his individual life expectancy, the life expectancy of a larger group of
which he was a member, or the more general information that the proposed treatment was unlikely to save
his life. The court did not indicate that the first datum was available, cited testimony that the second would
have been "inherently unreliable," id. at 139, and stated that the jury could have found that the physicians
in effect did disclose the third, id. at 140.
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The plaintiffs alleged that if the decedent had been properly informed of the
high probability of early death, he would not have submitted to a painful
therapy and would have averted the economic losses that resulted from his
failure to put his business and financial affairs in order promptly. While
upholding a jury verdict for the defendant and reaffirming the patient-based
standard of disclosure, the court nevertheless held that no rule of law mandated
the disclosure of specific information (including statistical life expectancy)
"beyond that implicated by the risks of death or serious harm and the potential
for complications" from a given treatment, 85 that the duty to disclose any
additional information should be defined by professional standards, and that
expert testimony was admissible for this purpose.86 Finally, the court
emphasized the importance of the jury's role in evaluating the factual context
to determine the sufficiency of the disclosures.87 In Part IV of this Article,
I argue that courts should foster this "sensitivity to context 88 not only by
securing the jury's fact-finding role but also by crafting and refining the legal
rules of informed consent so that the doctrine distinguishes among different
kinds of physician-patient settings when it defines the nature and scope of the
duty to disclose.89
Second, disputes arise concerning a physician's duty to disclose
alternatives. Physicians ordinarily must inform patients about the risks of
declining treatment90 as well as other reasonable alternatives. In some
jurisdictions, moreover, physicians must disclose the risks of even those
procedures that are more hazardous than the treatment they are in fact
recommending. 9'
Third, disputes arise concerning causation (or injury). Causation consists
of two prongs. Injury causation-the undisclosed risk must have caused the
patient's harm-is a necessary element of all informed consent claims, whether
pertaining to health care decisions, product warnings, tort law generally, or
other contexts. 92 Decision causation-had the patient been properly informed,
85. Id. at 143.
86. Id. at 143-44. The court, moreover, held that the duty to disclose did not extend to information
material to a patient's financial or other nonmedical interests. Id. at 141-42.
87. Id. at 13940.
88. Id. at 139.
89. See infra discussion Parts IV.C and IV.D.
90. See, e.g., Battenfeld v. Gregory, 589 A.2d 1059, 1061, 1066 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991)
(holding physician liable who said plaintiff could leave hospital if she signed form acknowledging departure
against medical advice, but did not inform her of specific risks if she departed); Truman v. Thomas, 611
P.2d 902, 906-07 (Cal. 1980) (holding physician liable who failed to disclose risks of patient's refusal,
despite physician's repeated urgings, to have Pap smear).
91. See, e.g., Logan v. Greenwich Hosp. Ass'n, 465 A.2d 294, 301-02 (Conn. 1983). There is no duty,
however, to disclose risks associated with diagnoses other than that which the physician is, in fact, making.
See, e.g., Pratt v. University of Minn. Affiliated Hosps., 414 N.W.2d 399, 402 (Minn. 1987).
92. Cf. Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, Informed Decision Making and the Law of Torts: The
Myth of Justiciable Causation, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 607, 617 ("As initially developed, the doctrine of
informed consent followed the traditional tort analysis of allowing recovery for damages proximately caused
by the violation of a duty.... [The procedure must have caused the patient's harm (injury causation).").
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she would have made a different treatment decision-is an additional
requirement in informed consent law.93 The plaintiff patient's testimony on
decision causation is ordinarily admissible, even though it is likely to be
biased, offered with the clarity of hindsight, and influenced by the adverse
outcome that in fact occurred.94 Perhaps for this reason, all states except
Oklahoma and Oregon apply an objective test of decision causation (i.e., what
treatment decision would a prudent person in the plaintiff's position have made
"if suitably informed of all perils bearing significance?").95
In most jurisdictions, the duty of disclosure is subject to certain exceptions.
These include situations in which (1) complete and candid disclosure might
adversely affect the patient's physical or psychological well-being
("therapeutic"); (2) the patient is incapable of giving consent by reason of
mental disability or infancy ("incompetence"); (3) an emergency makes
obtaining consent impractical ("emergency"); (4) the risk is either known to
the patient or is so obvious as to justify a presumption on the physician's part
that the patient knows of it ("actual knowledge" and "common knowledge");
(5) the procedure is simple and the danger remote and commonly appreciated
to be remote ("known remote risk"); and (6) the physician does not know of
an otherwise material risk and should not have been aware of it in the exercise
of ordinary care ("physician's reasonable ignorance").96
This, then, is the essence of the informed consent doctrine. Many
physicians will surely find this summary of principles highly unrealistic as an
account of what physicians-even those who deeply sympathize with their
patients' desires to know about and choose the risks to which they will be
exposed and who are scrupulously devoted to protecting and vindicating those
93. It is analogous to the requirement in a negligent diagnosis case that the plaintiff show that, had
a correct diagnosis been received, she would have made a different choice with respect to treatment.
94. See, e.g., Fore v. Brown, 544 So. 2d 955, 956 (Ala. 1989); see also David E. Seidelson, Lack of
Informed Consent in Medical Malpractice and Product Liability Cases: The Burden of Presenting Evidence,
14 HoFSTRA L. REv. 621 (1986) (discussing role of plaintiff testimony and evidence in proving cause-in-
fact); '1Iverski & Cohen, supra note 92, at 654-64 (arguing that doctrine's focus on cause-in-fact
compromises patient autonomy goal); cf Alan Meisel, The Expansion of Liability for Medical Accidents:
From Negligence to Strict Liability by Way of Informed Consent, 56 NEB. L. REV. 51, 123-32 (1977)
(explaining that "defective" informed consent in medical context approaches strict liability, allowing
recovery even though treatment itself was non-negligent).
95. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The Supreme Court of California
explained the reason for an objective test in a leading case: "We doubt that justice will be served by
placing the physician in jeopardy of the patient's bitterness and disillusionment. Thus an objective test is
preferable: i.e., what would a prudent person in the patient's position have decided if adequately informed
of all significant perils." Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 11-12 (Cal. 1972) (in bank).
In Oregon and Oklahoma, the standard is more subjective, defined in terms of what the specific
patient, rather than an objective "prudent" patient, would have decided had the information been properly
disclosed. Arena v. Gingrich, 748 P.2d 547 (Or. 1988); Spencer v. Seikel, 742 P.2d 1126, 1129 (Okla.
1987). In North Carolina, a court seemed to endorse such a subjective standard but was reversed by the
state legislature. McPherson v. Ellis, 287 S.E.2d 892, 896-97 (N.C. 1982) (considering relative merits of
both subjective and objective standards and deciding objective standard resulted in greater inequities); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 90-21.13(a) (1990) (imposing objective standard for informed consent). See generally
Seidelson, supra note 94.
96. E.g., Pauseher v. Iowa Methodist Medical Ctr., 408 N.W.2d 355, 360 (Iowa 1987).
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interests-actually do in clinical practice. Some of these more consumer-
oriented physicians will harbor even more subversive doubts about whether
effective implementation of these general principles can ever be feasible under
the conditions of practice and at a socially acceptable cost. These are important
questions, and I take them up in Part III, most pointedly in my consideration
of the argument from utility.
III. CONSENT IN HEALTH CARE TREATMENT DECISIONS: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS
In Part II, I described the central principles of informed consent in tort law
generally, in products liability law, and in informed consent proper. Here, I
isolate the key commonalities and differences between informed consent proper
and its warning analogues in these other settings. By focusing attention on
which features of the health care context are truly distinctive, meriting special
disclosure obligations, and which are not, this comparison can help to inform
the normative policy debate over whether the scope of informed consent
requirements in health care delivery should be expanded, retained, or reduced.
In the comparative analysis that follows, I do not conclude that the
physician-patient relationship is functionally equivalent to that between product
seller and buyer or between other risk creators and risk bearers governed by
tort law. I do not claim, therefore, that disclosure obligations in these settings
should be the same. We do and should view the physician-patient relationship
as different from the relationship between commercial buyers and sellers or
between other risk creators and victims, and the law of informed consent
should reflect these differences. On the other hand, the comparison reveals
more similarities than one might suspect and more than the literature suggests.
These similarities should give pause to the advocates of more robust
informed consent proper. The question is not whether informed consent proper
should be identical to informed consent in these other settings (in my view, it
should not), but whether it should be as different as it now is, or more
different still. The purpose of this Article is to raise this question and then to
suggest some ways in which we might answer it. At this point, however, no
reliable answer is possible because the crucial cost-effectiveness issues have
not been seriously addressed.97 The necessary analysis must not only consider
the informed consent doctrine as it now exists. Even more important, as
discussed in Part IV, the analysis should consider the doctrine as it might be
altered and implemented in at least three respects: if physicians' ability to
communicate risk information were improved; if the doctrine were to view
informed consent in a more contextual, differentiated fashion; and if physicians
97. See infra note 182 and accompanying text.
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and patients were given greater latitude to customize their own informed
consent regimes through contract.
A. The Doctrines Compared
In two important respects, the doctrine of informed consent imposes more
onerous obligations on health care providers than it does on product sellers and
other risk creators who may be liable to the plaintiff unless they can establish
that she knowingly and voluntarily consented to the risk. In several other, less
important respects, the doctrine demands less of health care providers.
First, health care providers are under a fiduciary duty to their patients,98
a duty that product sellers or most other risk creators do not owe. Thus, a
physician must always act in the patient's interests, whereas product sellers
can, within broad limits, ignore or even subvert their customers' interests.
Indeed, the physician must go so far as to prefer the patient's interests to her
own, acting as the patient's selfless, scrupulous, dutiful agent. This duty
underscores the purpose of informed consent proper, which is not simply to
provide information to empower the patient to protect her own interests, but
also, and perhaps more important, to further the physician's responsibility to
place the patient's interests above her own. Only through dialogue with the
patient can a physician come to understand the contours of the patient's
interests and, thus, be in a position to help advance them.
One implication of this fiduciary status is that the physician must make
more complete disclosures to the patient than the product seller must make to
the customer. Specifically, the physician must affirmatively disclose and
discuss not only all relevant information about the proposed treatment and her
reasons for recommending it, but also all reasonable alternatives, including
nontreatment.99 In contrast, a product seller is under no affirmative duty to
offer all information that its customer might want even if the customer asks for
it, much less to discuss alternatives (i.e., its competitor's products).
A second difference concerns the relative cost of obtaining informed
consent in the two milieus. Both physicians and product sellers are subject to
a negligence standard with respect to the information that they must provide.
For a physician, however, the cost of conforming to this standard is likely to
be significant even for a routine operation.' The physician incurs a cost for
98. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
99. For a discussion of the types of information that must be disclosed, which vary among different
jurisdictions, see supra note 72-95 and accompanying text.
100. If a physician reduces informed consent to a pro forma ritual, she might well violate the legal
duty. See, e.g., Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 553 So. 2d 398, 421 (La. 1989) (holding that warning on form
that surgery involved risk of "loss of function of body organs" was not "understandable communication
of any specific real risk"); Parikh v. Cunningham, 493 So. 2d 999, 1001-02 (Fla. 1986) (stating that
conclusive presumption that signed form constitutes valid informed consent arises only after statutory
requirements of informed consent are present).
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the time that she spends engaging in a meaningful dialogue with the patient
about risks. Even if this time is quite brief (as studies of existing practice
reveal it to be),'0 ' the level of physicians' compensation today ensures that
the cost in physician time will be significant. The fact that physicians
ordinarily are compensated by procedure rather than by time does not alter this
conclusion, for time (along with requisite skill) is probably the single most
important component of provider fees. This factor also gives physicians an
incentive to minimize the time that they spend on the procedure, including the
time they spend obtaining a patient's consent. Regardless of the specific
payment method for health care, the cost of additional time is likely to be
passed on to payors (patients, insurers, government) in some form (either
higher fees, premiums, or taxes; or fewer services or lower quality service).
Informed consent discussions may also have other, more subtle effects on
treatment, which are less readily measured but of equal or greater concern.'
In contrast, the primary cost a product seller incurs in warning consumers
of potential danger is the cost of ascertaining the product's risks, which in
most cases is already an explicit part of the product development process. The
pharmaceutical, automobile, and medical device industries are prominent
examples. 0 3 Disseminating that information is likely to entail little additional
cost. Once a product seller produces the requisite warning, it can simply and
routinely disseminate it by affixing an identical label to each product. The
marginal cost to the product seller of each warning after the first is negligible.
In comparison to physicians, a product seller's only cost disadvantage in
obtaining informed consent is that the product seller must gain the consumer's
attention in order to communicate information. In contrast, the physician
presumably has already engaged the patient in conversation, however brief and
desultory.
There is, of course, another side to informed consent's doctrinal ledger,
one that tends to favor health care providers relative to product sellers and
other tort defendants. First, a product plaintiff can prove cause-in-fact (i.e., that
101. Howard Waitzkin, Doctor Patient Communication: Clinical Implications of Social Scientific
Research, 252 JAMA 2441, 2442 (1984) (tape recordings of 336 doctor-patient encounters in variety of
clinical settings indicate that, in an average 20-minute encounter, physicians spent on average one minute
giving information to patients; physicians overestimated amount of time giving information by about a
factor of nine). Another study of informed consent in colonoscopy procedures found that, on average,
patients reported having spent 20 minutes with their doctor discussing the decision to undergo the test;
doctors reported an average of 13 minutes. Jennifer S. Mark & Howard Spiro, Informed Consent for
Colonoscopy: A Prospective Study, 150 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 777, 777-78 (1990). This physician-
patient difference could result from different perceptions regarding what portions of the dialogue constitute
part of the decisionmaking process.
102. One close student of clinical medicine observes, "application of this procedure to all decisions
for all patients would convert the commonplace into the extraordinary and might serve to paralyze
customary clinical practice." Interview with Dr. Ralph Horwitz, supra note 78.
103. See, e.g., THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION
120-224, 291-360 (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991) (pharmaceuticals and automobiles). See
generally STEVEN GARBER, PRODUCT LIABILITY AND THE ECONOMICS OF PHARMACEUTICALS AND
MEDICAL DEVICES (1993).
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the warning defect actually caused the injury) more easily than a patient can,
because the product victim can rely on the four presumptions discussed
earlier." By contrast, the patient must adduce direct evidence to establish
the necessary causal connections. Second, a finding that a product seller failed
to obtain the requisite consent has a greater precedential effect than in the
health care setting. Since product warnings are the same for all products
bearing that label, while physician-patient dialogues are ideally more focused
on the individual patient and her state of mind, a physician can more easily
distinguish an unfavorable precedent and avoid liability than can a product
seller.
Thus, some aspects of informed consent are more onerous for physicians
than for other tort defendants while other aspects of informed consent are less
onerous. Does this mean that the comparison is a wash and that physicians'
duty to obtain informed consent is no more burdensome than that of other tort
defendants? I think not. The aspects of informed consent that demand more
from physicians (the scope of the duty and the clinical context) directly
regulate their conduct and impose real costs, while the aspects that demand
less from them (causal presumptions and precedential effect) instead concern
the process of informed consent litigation, which appears to be relatively
rare105 and shapes physician practice only indirectly. On balance, then,
informed consent doctrine imposes greater burdens on physicians than on other
risk creators who are subject to more limited (or even nonexistent) duties to
warn.'16 The interesting question is why.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 69-70.
105. In one empirical study of medical malpractice claims, only 1% of the claims against physicians
and 2% of those against hospitals were classified as "failure to instruct patient." NATIONAL ASS'N OF INS.
COM'RS, Medical Malpractice Closed Claims 1975-1978, in 2 MALPRACTICE CLAIMS: FINAL
COMPILATION 456, Tables 6.9 and 6.10 (M. Patricia Sowka ed., 1980). In other studies, the claims
categories are too broad and highly aggregated to enable one to identify those cases that involve informed
consent claims. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: CHARACTERISTICS OF
CLAIMS CLOSED IN 1984, at 76 (1987) ("[o]ther" category includes "failure to follow consent policies" as
well as seven other subcategories); PATRICIA DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND
PUBLIC POLICY (1985) (discussing overall effect of four reforms, including those related to informed
consent, but not distinguishing among them). Randall R. Bovbjerg, a health policy researcher at the Urban
Institute, brought these examples to my attention. Telephone Interview with Randall R Bovbjerg, Senior
Research Associate, Urban Institute (Oct. 4, 1993).
106. There are several doctrinal differences between the informed consent obligations of physicians
and those of others, but these do not amount to much of a distinction in practice. First, as we have seen,
a physician's duty to obtain informed consent is measured in some jurisdictions by the standard of the
profession, while a product seller's duty is measured by a reasonableness standard. However, this distinction
collapses if, as has been suggested, professional custom seldom, if ever, deviates from reasonableness. See
Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The TJ. Hooper: The Theory and History of Custom in the Law of Tort,
21 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1992). Second, in the health care context, expert testimony may be required to
establish the standard of informed consent See Pauscher v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 408 N.W.2d 355
(Iowa 1987) (noting that expert testimony is ordinarily required). This may advantage physicians if they
have greater access to experts than do product sellers. Third, if a physician can show that a more
demanding disclosure would have posed a risk to the patient's medical condition or outcome, she need not
make it. See, e.g., Pauscher, 408 N.W.2d at 360. While a product seller cannot assert this "therapeutic"
defense, she may achieve a similar result through a "reasonableness" defense. If the seller can show that
a more extensive disclosure would simply have confused the consumer by creating "information overload,"
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B. Can the Greater Informed Consent Burden on Physicians Be Justified?
This Section seeks to develop a more critical perspective on informed
consent doctrine by exploring possible justifications for the more onerous
disclosure obligations that the law imposes on physicians, justifications to
which neither courts nor commentators appear to have given much
thought. 10 7 The strongest justificatory arguments proceed from concerns
about individual autonomy, relational continuity, conflicts of interest,
inequalities of power and information, and utility. My consideration and
appraisal of these five arguments leads me to two conclusions. First, these
arguments provide weaker support for the relatively demanding informed
consent requirement in health care than is sometimes supposed. Second,
powerful dynamics in the health care system that are pushing physician-patient
relationships in a more cost-conscious, bureaucratic direction are at once
undermining some of these arguments and reinforcing others.
1. The Argument from Individual Autonomy
The most fundamental normative argument in favor of requiring health
care providers to obtain patients' informed consent to medical treatments
proceeds from the principle of autonomy-the notion that each mature
individual has a right to make the basic choices that affect her life
prospects.05 The more private the choice-that is, the more it concerns the
integrity of the individual's own projects and self-conception and the less it
directly affects others-the more robust this right should be. Few if any
choices are more private and intimate than those that concern the use made of
one's own body, and thus society should not permit one's bodily integrity to
be threatened by another unless one has knowingly and voluntarily consented
to (i.e., willed) the intrusion.0 9
The autonomy principle is deeply entrenched in our culture and law; few
exceptions to it-compulsory immunization"0 and military conscription"'
are the major examples-have been recognized. This principle, however,
the seller may be excused from providing the more complex disclosure. See cases cited in Schwartz, The
Beginning and the Possible End, supra note 16, at 666 n.342.
107. For several exceptions, see Seidelson, supra note 94, at 647-51, and Twerski & Cohen, supra
note 92.
108. This view is advanced most elegantly in KATZ, supra note 1, at 104-29. For a recent review of
the law's treatment of autonomy, see Bruce J. Winick, On Autonomy: Legal and Psychological
Perspectives, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1705 (1992).
109. This argument dates to the origins of the informed consent in the common law doctrine of
battery. See Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosps., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914) (doctor performed additional
medically necessary but unauthorized procedures during surgery); Rolater v. Strain, 137 P. 96, 97 (Okla.
1913) (barring physician from performing surgery without patient's consent).
110. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (upholding compulsory immunization).
111. See, e.g., Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461 (1971) (upholding selective service system
against religious challenge to conscription).
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applies no more strongly to medical choices than to other choices that alter the
status quo and risk bodily injury, such as a decision to consume alcohol or to
drive a fast car. Each choice equally implicates the autonomy principle in that
each requires a tradeoff between an imagined benefit and a risk of personal
harm. Treatment decisions can, but need not, entail risks of bodily harm and
other adverse consequences more grave than those entailed by other choices.
The same patient who receives medical treatment from a physician may also
consume an over-the-counter drug. Both of these interventions implicate the
patient's autonomy; the drug physically invades the body while the treatment
may or may not. The patient surrenders some control to an external agent in
both cases. Why, then, is the physician's informed consent duty far greater
than that of the drug manufacturer?
The value of autonomy, moreover, is a function of the range of choice
realistically available to the individual. In some areas of medical care, such as
treatment for breast cancer, the patient may have a number of options (e.g.,
lumpectomy, single or double mastectomy, radiation, chemotherapy, and close
surveillance). But in other medical situations, including some acute episodes,
a patient has few (or no) practical alternatives from which to choose. For
example, if an operation is needed to save her life, the patient may face a
Hobson's choice. In other risky activities, by contrast, many choices (and thus
many occasions for exercising meaningful autonomy) are usually available.
Most consumers, for example, regard as salient a large number of product
characteristics (e.g., performance, appearance, cost, durability, warranty terms),
whereas patients who have already selected their providers (at least the vast
majority who are insured) usually focus on but two dimensions of the
treatment: the prospect of pain or discomfort, and the probabilities of various
medical outcomes." 2 To put the point another way, certain nonmedical
activities may implicate that part of autonomy concerned with the expression
of personality through the exercise of idiosyncratic choice more than medical
care does.
Finally, the existing doctrine of informed consent proper (the law in books)
is in one important sense inconsistent with a thoroughgoing commitment to
individual autonomy. Under this doctrine, the only kind of injury that can
constitute a compensable harm is an adverse medical outcome. A physician
may with impunity flagrantly deny her patient the choice to which the patient's
right of informed consent entitles her so long as she renders the treatment
112. See Mark & Spiro, supra note 101, at 780 ("Informed consent is ubiquitous in medical practice,
but patient autonomy in medical decision making is not supported by most patients or physicians....
[A]utonomous decision making by an informed and self-sufficient patient is probably rarer in clinical
practice than in philosophical suggestion.").
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competently, and she leaves the patient no worse off medically than
before 1
3
2. The Argument from Relational Continuity
One can argue that the physician-patient interaction is best viewed not as
a single transaction but rather as a long-term, continuing relationship. In this
view, the proper analogy for thinking about the distinctive features of informed
consent proper is not conventional private law, which typically governs
episodic exchanges between product sellers and buyers or interactions between
risk creators and victims who are strangers. Instead, the argument runs, a better
analogy is to long-term relational contracts,' 14 intrafamilial torts," ' and
other regulatory domains such as the law of the workplace, which govern more
complex relationships involving mutual dependency, emotional attachments and
vulnerability, and collaboration over time.
Even if this relational continuity accurately characterizes many physician-
patient interactions in the past and many of those that continue today, it has
not been present in many situations in which informed consent is likely to be
most important. Surgical anesthesiology, for example, is performed by
physicians with whom the patient ordinarily has no prior or subsequent
relationship. Surgery often (and hopefully) involves only a one-time encounter.
Many physicians who prescribe birth control pills have little contact with the
patient thereafter.
For better or worse, the traditional image of the intimate, protracted
relationship between physician and patient has grown increasingly
anachronistic. Today, health care providers are abandoning the decentralized,
family practice model in favor of delivery systems that assign enrolled patients
to a series of professionals whom the patients do not know. Even if the
idealized vision of physician-patient interactions continues to be that of a
longstanding relationship based on personal intimacy and earned trust, it seems
safe to predict that most health care in the future will be delivered in a highly
bureaucratic-technocratic context that discourages such relationships. In this
context, informed consent cannot credibly function as the dialogic expression
of a relationship that no longer exists. Instead, health care interactions will
come to resemble the commercial sales and other episodic transactions to
which less demanding informed consent requirements apply in other areas of
tort law.
113. Commentators have severely criticized this limited conception of the harm suffered by a patient
who has been deprived of full, informed choice. See, e.g., KATZ, supra note 1, at 82-84; Schultz, supra
note 75, at 228-29, 298.
114. See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REv.
1089 (1981).
115. See generally PROSSER & KEErON, supra note 13, at 901-39.
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3. The Argument from Conflict of Interest
A third argument for a demanding informed consent requirement in health
care rests on the recognition that a physician's interests can conflict with those
of her patient, and that more demanding informed consent requirements
provide the appropriate legal shield against this possibility.1 6
When health care is provided on a fee-for-service basis, the physician's
revenue increases with the volume and complexity of care that she provides.
Current third-party payor arrangements further desensitize both patient and
physician to economic tradeoffs; at the margin, this system creates a bias in
favor of additional care even when cost-effectiveness and risk-benefit
considerations would dictate less care. 17  By contrast, in a health
maintenance organization (HMO) or other pre-paid capitation system, the
provider organization increases its profits (and thus, indirectly, the physician's)
by limiting service (subject, of course, to market and malpractice constraints).
In both the fee-for-service and HMO sectors, a provider's interests may favor
more or less care than a fully informed patient (especially a cost-sensitive one)
would want or choose.
I emphatically do not suggest that economic factors alone dictate
providers' decisions. In fact, ethical norms, fiduciary duties, reputational
concerns, and the threat of malpractice liability would strongly constrain
provider behavior even if no independent economic incentives existed. At some
margin, however, the economic interests of provider and patient do diverge,
and this margin will grow wider as the health care system becomes more cost-
conscious. We should not imagine, moreover, that economic conflicts of
interest between physician and patient are the only kind at issue; their complex
emotional relationship provides fertile soil for psychodynamic conflicts as
well."'
116. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of University of California, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 1388 (1991).
117. See, e.g., Robert Pear, Doctors Assailed in Antitrust Move, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1993, at A25
(discussing Federal Trade Commission use of antitrust laws against joint ventures formed by doctors who
sent patients to equipment companies in which doctors had invested).
118. Professor Katz noted:
Physicians' quest for political power mirrors the quest for interpersonal domination of the
physician-patient relationship. The public's reluctance to delegate exclusive authority to one
group of healers during most of medicine's history may have been symptomatic of its
misgivings over the unquestioned trust and obedience that doctors demanded from their patients.
These misgivings could be voiced openly in situations when the public was not in direct contact
with doctors, while in more intimate encounters patients could only express them passively and
silently through noncompliance with their doctors' orders.
KATZ, supra note 1, at 46-47; see also id. at 85-86 ("[T]he idea of sharing the burdens of decision with
patients will create new tensions; it will also bring to the surface old tensions that solitary decisionmaking
has obscured."), and at 142-50 (analogizing to emotional tensions of the analyst-patient relationship). Some
commentators have emphasized the powerful psychodynamics unleashed by product advertising and
purchasing. See, e.g., VANCE PACKARD, THE STATUS SEEKERS 307-19 (1959).
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Without minimizing the importance of these provider-patient conflicts, the
crucial point for present purposes is that they pale in comparison to the
conflicts of interest that divide product seller and consumer and that divide risk
creators and risk bearers in other areas of tort law. In accidents between
strangers (the classic case is a vehicular collision), the interests of those who
create risks and those who bear them are in far greater conflict. There, the
extralegal concerns-competitive, reputational, and ethical-that make health
care and product risk creators mindful of potential victims' interests are weaker
or wholly absent. And yet, in these other areas, courts apply less stringent
disclosure requirements to risk creators and limit their liability by recognizing
defenses such as assumed risk and contributory fault. In product markets, a
seller's interest in profit maximization is relatively unconstrained; it is limited
only by products liability law's less robust, nonfiduciary duty to warn." 9
4. The Argument from Inequality of Information and Power
A fourth argument for a more demanding informed consent requirement
in health care emphasizes the imbalances in information and bargaining power
that permit providers to exploit their patients. Surely such imbalances justify
requiring providers to disclose treatment risks and rationales to patients before
obtaining their consent. The more interesting question, however, is whether
these imbalances justify making the informed consent obligation more
demanding in health care than in other areas, especially products liability.
In both the health care and consumer product contexts, sellers are more
likely than purchasers to know or be able to learn cheaply about the risks
inherent in the treatment or product. But is the physician-patient disparity in
access to relevant risk information greater than the disparity between product
sellers and purchasers? Are product choices in general better informed than
treatment choices?
These are difficult questions, but in each case the answer is not obviously
"yes." Since most treatment and product risks are quite low, 2' both patients
119. In both product and health care markets, of course, extralegal pressures-which are based on
competitive, ethical and reputational concerns-also operate to encourage fuller disclosure. These pressures
are probably more powerful than the legal ones with which this Article is concerned.
120. Even comparing medical treatment and product risks along a single dimension, such as
magnitude, is difficult. Thanks to a recent study of medical malpractice, the most comprehensive ever
conducted, the data on treatment risks are relatively good. This study reported that adverse events (defined
as "unintended or unexpected harmful consequences of medical intervention ... that prolonged the
hospitalization beyond the time required by the underlying illness and/or caused disability at the time of
hospital discharge or death") were suffered by 3.7% of hospital patients in New York in 1984. Of these
adverse events, one quarter (27.6%) were due to provider negligence rather than to natural causes or non-
negligent care. This means that just under 1% of hospital patients suffered adverse events due to
negligence. PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACICE 35, 43 (1993). About 14% of the
adverse events (and 25% of the negligent ones) resulted in death. Id. at 44, Table 3.2. Because the study
counted as deaths from adverse events those in which the treatment merely hastened an already imminent
death, a more accurate measure of the risk of serious injury is the fraction of adverse events that caused
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and product consumers tend to estimate them poorly on their own. t But the
uncertainty surrounding many treatments means that even physicians are not
omniscient about treatment risks; in some situations the disparity between their
own ignorance and that of their patients may be no greater than that between
the sellers and buyers of technologically complex products. Compared to most
product risks, some common treatment risks-such as those associated with
iatrogenic illnesses-are relatively large, and patients may know more about
them than consumers know about most risks associated with the products they
purchase.122
Patients often do confront information inequalities greater than those faced
by product consumers and other potential risk bearers. Many health services
are "credence" goods, whose evaluation depends on the opinion of experts
(usually physicians) who act as gatekeepers to treatment; in contrast, most
consumer products are either "search" goods, whose qualities consumers can
ascertain by prepurchase inspection, or "experience" goods, whose qualities
consumers can determine after they have consumed them. 3 Product
severe to total permanent disability, which was 3% (or 0.03% for hospitalized patients overall). Id.;
Telephone Interview with Professor Paul C. Weiler, Harvard Law School (Sept. 30, 1993).
When we turn to product risks, the data are more sparse and the situation is murkier. Letter from NV.
Kip Viscusi, Professor of Economics, Duke University, to author (Oct. 8, 1993). The annual risk of death
from cigarette smoking (I in 150) is much higher than that from medical treatment in hospitals. The annual
risk of fatal accidents in the home from all causes is I in 11,000. W. Kip ViSCUSi, SMOKING: MAKING THE
RISKY DECISION 24 (1992). But the risk of death from products, which is only a subset of this broad
category, is uncertain, and the risk of serious injury from products is even more uncertain. For most
products, these risks are probably much lower than those from medical treatment. For some dangerous
products, however, the risks may be higher than for medical treatment.
121. See VISCUSI, supra note 120, at 22-34; JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 24, at 463-
89 (on perceived risk of actual incidents). According to a leading researcher in this field, "[o]ur studies
suggest people do a horrible job of making decisions with respect to risks on the order of 1 in a million,
but once we get to a denominator in the range of 10,000 their responses start to make sense." Letter from
W. Kip Viscusi to author, supra note 120.
People estimate risks differently depending on the context of the risk assessment and the specific
character of the risk involved. James R. Bettman et al., Cognitive Considerations in Presenting Risk
Information, in LEARNING ABOUT RISK: CONSUMER AND VORKER RESPONSES TO HAZARD INFORMATION
13, 14 (,V. Kip Viscusi & Wesley A. Magat eds., 1987) (people overestimate risks that receive media
attention but underestimate risks of products they have used previously without injury); W. Kip Viscusi,
Do Smokers Underestimate Risks?, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1253, 1253 (1990) (both smokers and nonsmokers
greatly overestimate lung cancer risk from smoking and extent of overestimation is much greater than
extent of underestimation); W. Kip VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS 70-73 (1992) (summarizing survey evidence
on individual risk valuations of nonfatal health risks).
122. If knowledge of these risks is common enough among patients, a disclosure obligation may not
be triggered in the first place. See note 96 and accompanying text ("common knowledge" exception). There
are also analogous exceptions with respect to product warnings and assumed risk. See, e.g., Neff v. Coleco
Indus., 760 F. Supp. 864, 868 (D. Kan. 1991) (finding no duty to warn of risk of diving head-first into
four-feet deep pool with which plaintiff was familiar), aff'd mem., 961 F.2d 220 (10th Cir. 1992); Joseph
E. Seagram & Sons v. McGuire, 814 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Tex. 1991) (finding no duty to warn of risk of
alcoholism from excessive consumption of alcoholic beverages since "[f]rom ancient times, the danger...
has been widely known and recognized."); cf. Armentrout v. FMC Corp., 842 P.2d 175, 181 (Colo. 1992)
("If the danger is open and obvious, there is no duty to warn unless there is a substantial likelihood that
the proposed warning would have prevented injury to the ordinary user.").
123. The distinction between search and experience qualities of consumer goods was developed by
Phillip Nelson, Advertising as Information, 82 J. POL. ECON. 729, 730 (1974); Phillip Nelson, Information
and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL. ECON. 311, 312 (1970). For a discussion of credence goods, see
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consumers, moreover, are more likely than health care consumers to be repeat
purchasers. Consumer products also tend to be more standardized than health
services, which must often be tailored to patients' particular characteristics.
And, as noted earlier, physicians are already in some dialogue with their
patients when informed consent obligations arise, while product sellers who
wish to warn of product risks must first undertake the very difficult task of
winning the consumer's attention amid the babel and clamor of competitors in
the market. This difference may affect the cost of providing the information
upon which consent can be based.
While such differences exist and are often important, one should not
exaggerate either their universality or their magnitude. In fact, numerous
exceptions to these generalizations exist. For example, consumers treat as
credence goods some expensive, infrequently purchased products such as
automobiles, homes, and pension funds. On the other side, patients treat some
medical treatments as experience goods that they can evaluate independently
according to how they feel the treatments have affected them. Repeat purchase
of some medical services is common; two prominent examples are
psychotherapy and chiropractic treatment. The standardized goods criterion also
fails to distinguish patients from product consumers. For example, many
clinical tests, vaccinations, and some other health services are uniform for all
patients, while product consumers vary greatly in how they value the various
attributes of even the most standard products. Different consumers also use
standard products in quite different ways. 24
These factors muddy, but do not wholly eliminate, the health care product
distinction with respect to information inequality. Still, the considerations just
discussed suggest that the size of the information gap is not invariably so much
larger in health care than in product markets as to explain fully the greater
demands of informed consent doctrine in health care. At the very least, the
analysis suggests that even if the informational inequality between physician
and patient justifies more demanding informed consent duties in certain health
care contexts, it does not justify the current legal regime, which fails to
differentiate disclosure duties adequately and tailor them to particular contexts
and preferences. This point is discussed at greater length in Part IV.
The argument from inequality of bargaining power (which depends in part
on information asymmetries) is in some respects even murkier than the
argument from informational inequality. First, it is not clear how bargaining
power should be measured, for it depends on a number of factors, including
conditions of supply and demand, the distribution of information, the
Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16 L. & ECON. 67,
68-70 (1973).
124. Priest, Current Insurance Crisis, supra note 16, at 1548-49, 1557-58 (product warranties designed




availability of substitutes, and the nature of consumer psychology. In principle
and often in fact, some health care consumers can select their providers and
move from one to another if they are dissatisfied. Others cannot. Those who
join "closed-panel" group practice plans like I-MO's, for example, usually
waive that freedom. Many patients who could shop for providers nevertheless
fail to do so because of habit, ignorance, intimidation, lack of economic
incentive, and the practice of referrals to designated specialists. Second,
corporate and governmental budgetary pressures are forcing the health care
delivery system to change in ways likely to enhance the future power of
consumers in the aggregate, if not also individually. In particular, the system
is moving relentlessly toward higher levels of organization, closer price and
quality monitoring, and more intense competition among provider groups for
access to patients.'25
Even now, patients' bargaining power is not obviously or systematically
weaker than that of consumers in products markets. Product consumers are not
as well organized (except perhaps in purchasing cooperatives or monopsony
situations such as government procurement) as health care consumers in the
IMO and other sectors, in which employers and other large groups can and
sometimes do act as consumer proxies. 2 6 Even more anomalous from this
perspective, individuals who make non-product, non-health-care choices-for
example, people who unwittingly expose themselves to man-made
environmental hazards-are even less organized than product consumers. These
individuals do not usually contract with those who create the risks, as their
product and health care counterparts do; they may not even know the risk
creator's identity. Yet they are entitled to less information than even product
purchasers, and far less than patients.
If patients possess weak bargaining power, their impotence is less the
result of the structure of their choices about providers and treatments 27 than
of the set of deferential attitudes that many patients bring to their relationships
with providers. These attitudes reflect, in part, anxieties about their health,
their inferior social status vis-4-vis physicians, and their relative ignorance
about medicine. 28 What is less clear is whether the law of informed consent
can or should do much to alter these attitudes-a question that is directly
pertinent to the utility of the doctrine.
125. See, e.g., PAUL STARR, THE LOGIC OF HEALTH-CARE REFORM (1992); Dana Priest, A Health
Care Primer: How 'Managed Competition' Would Work, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 1993, at Al, A1.
126. See, e.g., Walton Francis, A Health Care Program Run by the Federal Government That Works,
AM. ENTERPRISE, July/Aug. 1993, at 50 (describing Federal Employees Health Benefits Program).
127. Indeed, patients' choices have actually increased due to the growing surplus of physicians
(especially in urban centers) and the improvements in health care technology.
128. See, e.g., NULAND, supra note 20, at 246-69; KATZ, supra note 1; Duffy, supra note 20, at 27-28.
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5. The Argument from Utility
A final argument for a more demanding informed consent duty in health
care emphasizes the doctrine's usefulness to the patient who faces a treatment
decision. Of all the arguments, this is in a sense the most straightforward.
Although the doctrine has a number of aims, its most outcome-oriented goal
is to inform and thus improve the treatment decision by assuring that the
patient will receive crucial factual information about risks, benefits,
alternatives, and reasoning. The argument from utility, then, seeks to justify the
doctrine in terms of this goal.
Yet if the requirement elicits information that does not in fact affect, much
less improve, the patient's decision, it is difficult to justify imposing the
duty-unless it is costless or produces some good whose value does not
depend on how efficacious the information is to the patient's treatment.
Perhaps autonomy is such a goal, yet it is odd, even unintelligible, to speak of
autonomy as desirable or useful unless the individual can actually exercise or
enjoy it.
Actual utility, then, is arguably the most important criterion by which
informed consent should be evaluated.'29 The vast literature on informed
consent, although much of it is empirical, 30 fails to provide reliable answers
to the crucial questions about how the doctrine actually works-the law in
action. A 1983 survey, for example, noted that "there has been no really
satisfactory empirical investigation of the central question: 'What do doctors
routinely tell patients?" 3'. The same is even more true of another crucial
question: What difference does it make? The discussion that follows
summarizes the little that is known about these issues.
A priori, there are strong reasons to suspect that informed consent, at least
the law in books, is often honored in the breach and almost impossible to
enforce as a practical matter. Most of the existing empirical studies on
informed consent support this intuition. These studies reveal three related
129. As Meisel and Roth noted:
The operation of such regulatory systems involves a substantial commitment of resources, which
if they do not achieve their ends, might better be devoted to other forms of regulation or to no
regulation at all. Furthermore, the imposition of legal requirements that are inefficacious and
wasteful of scarce resources may foster contempt for lav in general.
Alan Meisel & Loren H. Roth, Toward an Informed Discussion of Informed Consent: A Review and
Critique of the Empirical Studies, 25 ARIZ. L. REv. 265, 268 (1983).
130. Id. at 270.
131. Id. at 283. One study indicates that while 90% of the physicians surveyed in 1961 preferred not
to inform patients of a cancer diagnosis, 97% of physicians surveyed in 1976 routinely informed patients
about such diagnoses. Dennis H. Novak et al., Changes in Physicians' Attitudes Towards Telling the
Cancer Patient, 241 JAMA 897, 898 (1979). It is not clear from the study whether this revealed a change
in physicians' preferences (perhaps arising out of the availability of improved treatment options) rather than
in their behavior, and whether the change occurred because of informed consent doctrine or for some other
reason. The recent Arato decision, see supra note 83 and accompanying text, attributes the change in part
to intervening court decisions, but cites no evidence to support that supposition. Arato v. Avedon, 23 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 131, 138 n.7 (1993); see also infra note 154.
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impediments to implementation of informed consent doctrine: (1) most
physician-patient discussions appear to be rather perfunctory and reinforce
physician control; (2) the treatment context discourages patients from
exploiting the information that physicians do provide; and (3) the nature of the
tort system makes it difficult for patients to establish an effective legal claim.
First, regardless of the formal doctrinal requirements, the usefulness of
informed consent depends on a meaningful dialogue between physician and
patient. Yet the minimally necessary ingredients of such a dialogue-questions
by the patient, full and discursive responses by the physician that invite the
patient to ask follow-up questions-are usually absent in most clinical
situations. Studies indicate that patients rarely initiate a dialogue by asking
questions, that physicians often discourage genuinely dialogic, open-ended
discourse about treatment, and that patients seldom ask follow-up
questions.'32  Physicians discourage active, give-and-take dialogue. 33
Although patients invariably sign the consent forms, this appears to have little
effect on how patients actually make decisions. 1" This is not at all
surprising, especially when one considers that in many cases the crucial
decision has been made well before the form is even presented for signing.
I35
Patients' recall of information, alternatives, and risks is low.136 While the
132. As Meisel and Roth summarize the empirical findings, "information is not very actively provided
by doctors to patients, nor do patients actively solicit information. Although doctors do not volunteer much
information, when patients ask questions doctors tend to answer them, although it is not clear how fully
and forthrightly." Meisel & Roth, supra note 129, at 334; see also KAFz, supra note 1, at 84, 125;
CHARLES V. LIDZ Er AL., INFORMED CONSENT: A STUDY OF DECISIONMAKING IN PSYCHIATRY 94-99
(1984); Cathy J. Jones, Autonomy and Informed Consent in Medical Decisionmaking: Toward a New Self-
Fulfilling Prophecy, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 379, 397427 (1990) (presenting participant-observation
study in hospital and reviewing other studies).
133. Meisel and Roth summarize the studies: "Information is given to acquiescent patients to obtain
their compliance with treatment, and to resistant patients to overcome their opposition.... [P]atients either
go along with or refuse to go along with doctors' recommendations." Meisel & Roth, supra note 129, at
334. There is some evidence that the nature and scope of disclosures vary with the patient's socioeconomic
status, that patients say that they want more information than they are getting, and that patients and
physicians have different perceptions about the quantity and quality of information that is actually being
discussed. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE & BIOMEDICAL &
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: A REPORr ON THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL
IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE PATIENT-PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP, VOLUME ONE:
REPORT 70-102 (1982).
134. See, e.g., LIDZ ET AL., supra note 132, at 318; Jones, supra note 132, at 400-04.
135. The most common example is the discussion between the patient and the anesthesiologist, which
ordinarily takes place on the eve of surgery, after the patient has decided to enter the hospital and undergo
the operation.
136. Meisel & Roth, supra note 129, at 295. Although a number of studies show that patient recall,
even shortly after the disclosures, is quite low with respect to risks and alternatives, recall and
understanding are not the same. These studies, therefore, do not necessarily prove that the patient lacked
understanding at the time of disclosure. Meisel and Roth discuss this point at length. Id. at 288-90, 292-95.
Interestingly, data from a very recent study of birth mothers indicate a remarkable degree of
information recall by the mothers five years after delivery. Penny B. Githens et al., Accuracy of Maternal
Recall of Risk Factors and Events During Pregnancy, Labor/Delivery, and Child's Early Infancy, BIRmT
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 7, on file with author). This finding might reflect the fact that the birth of
one's child is perhaps the only hospitalization for a condition that is both desired and ordinarily leads to
an altogether happy experience there-a circumstance that might make the events surrounding it vividly
memorable. See infra note 214 and accompanying texL It might also reflect the emphasis, unusual in health
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studies shed very little light on the pivotal questions of how well patients
understand and use the information that is disclosed, anecdotal and social
science evidence alike demonstrate that informed consent law in action is often
ritualistic, formalistic, and hollow.137 The disclosures do not appear to reduce
significantly patients' dependency on, and deference to, their physicians.'38
One revealing sign of the extent to which physicians orchestrate a more or less
perfunctory process is a now-common locution among physicians. They do not
say that they have obtained the patient's consent; rather, they say that they
have "consented the patient."'
39
Second, the clinical treatment setting tends to discourage meaningful
exchange of information. This fact can be explained in straightforward terms
without assuming either that patients are irrational or that their physicians are
autocratic. n4 The truth is that even reflective, highly rational
patients-individuals who ordinarily and self-consciously seek information and
weigh alternatives in making careful choices about their lives, and who are
confident of their ability to do so-may not want much information about risks
or alternatives in this particular context. This attitude should not be surprising
given the costs to patients of acquiring the requisite information, in terms of
fees for the physician's time, the patients' own time, and the anxiety and
conflict that a more elaborate discussion might arouse. Instead, they may prefer
to devote their limited resources to selecting a physician on whose judgment
they are content to rely in making subsequent treatment decisions. 14' These
patients may reason that as one-shot decisionmakers (and often ill-informed,
anxious ones at that), they will be prone to cognitive errors from which a more
detached professional, who has honed her judgment over the course of
numerous such decisions, will be relatively immune. As for the physician, her
ritualistic compliance may be the result not so much of her arrogance as of her
care, on informing expectant mothers about the nature of the prenatal and perinatal processes that they are
undergoing.
137. See, e.g., E.K. Stem et al., What Pediatricians Really Know About Immunizations and Informed
Consent, 137 AM. J. DISEASES CHILDREN 530 (1983) (38% of doctors thought consent should be obtained
routinely but only 7% obtained written consent and 32% obtained verbal consent; only 39% warned about
serious side-effects); Mark & Spiro, supra note 101, at 778 (40 out of 102 colonoscopy patients believed
their doctor was primarily responsible for decision to undergo procedure).
138. Jones, supra note 132, at 397-425.
139. Professor Henry Greely, Remarks at Vanderbilt University Seminar on Medical Malpractice (Apr.
15-17, 1993); Interview with Dr. Jonathan Katz, Associate Clinical Professor of Anesthesiology, Yale
University School of Medicine, in New Haven, Conn. (Mar. 5, 1993).
140. For one account of the development of physician autocracy, see KA'Z, supra note I, at 1-47.
141. Consumers behave in a similar fashion when information is readily available but, for one reason
or another, costly to assimilate. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Legislative Methodology: Some Lessons from
the Truth-in-Lending Act, 80 GEO. L.J. 233, 236 (1991) (despite mandated disclosure of annual percentage
rate, consumer installment loan borrowers were unable to process information correctly). On the other hand,
studies show that even experts make cognitive errors of their own. JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra
note 24, at 154.
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fear of liability, even if that fear (the law in the mind) is unjustified.1 42 The
physician's perfunctory behavior may also reflect a lack of training in how to
communicate effectively with patients.143
I have been speaking here of reflective, highly rational patients. However,
many patients, perhaps most, are neither reflective nor highly rational in this
sense, especially in the clinical milieus in which informed consent is sought.
Instead, they are often anxious, intimidated, and abjectly-even
neurotically-inclined to acquiesce in their physician's professional
judgment.' 44 If these considerations induce deference and passivity in many
of the most rational, self-confident patients, they will surely influence the less
reflective ones even more strongly.
A third obstacle to implementation of informed consent law in the books
is the nature of the tort system. This system suggests that the doctrine cannot,
except in the most egregious cases, be enforced effectively against physicians
who are ignorant of it, evade it, or comply with it only formalistically. Patients
are unlikely to recall long after the fact what a physician said to them;145 still
less are they able to recall just how the information was communicated, which
is even more pertinent to the doctrine's purposes. Other than the parties' own
recollections, the only extrinsic evidence of the physician-patient conversation
will probably be any notes that the physician entered in the patient's chart, and
the consent form that the patient signed reciting that she heard and understood
what was disclosed to her and that her decision was voluntary and informed.
Thus, in the unlikely event of litigation, the case will consist of the patient's
memory and word-biased (or so it may seem to the jury) by her adverse
medical outcome-against the physician's.
Even if a patient can succeed in showing that her physician did not obtain
the requisite informed consent, she will have difficulty proving that the lack
of informed consent was the cause in fact of her unfavorable outcome. As
noted earlier, courts have been understandably reluctant to presume that the
patient, if properly informed, would have made a different treatment decision
142. For a discussion of analogous behavior, see PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN
REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 73-75 (1983) ("self-conscious formalism" by officials fearing liability).
143. Medical school curricula are reportedly placing greater emphasis on teaching "bedside manner"
now than in the past. James F. Blumstein, Remarks at Vanderbilt University Seminar on Medical
Malpractice (Apr. 15-17, 1993). On the other hand, Dr. Jay Katz, a leading advocate for more
comprehensive and meaningful physician-patient discussions, believes that his own strenuous efforts to
educate medical students and doctors on the subject "have largely failed." Interview with Dr. Jay Katz,
Elizabeth K. Dollard Professor Emeritus of Law, Medicine and Psychiatry, Yale Law School, in New
Haven, Conn. (Mar. 22, 1993). These discursive difficulties do not appear to be confined to physician-
patient relationships in the United States; they seem to be universal. See INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL
BENEFIT/RISK FOUNDATION, IMPROVING PATIENT INFORMATION AND EDUCATION ON MEDICINES (1993).
144. KATZ, supra note 1, at 125.
145. Indeed, recall appears to be poor even shortly after the event. See supra note 136; see also David
A. Herz et al., Informed Consent: Is It a Myth?, 30 NEUROSURGERY 453, 454 (patients remembered 43.5%
of information immediately after disclosure, 38.4% four to six weeks later); Louise M. Wallace, Informed
Consent to Elective Surgery: The 'Therapeutic' Value?, 22 SOc. SCI. MED. 29, 30-31 (1986) (review of
studies; patients forget between 28-71% of information within minutes of doctor's verbal explanation).
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than she actually did, much less that this hypothetical decision would have
produced a better medical outcome.'46 Even more important, the generally
low level of treatment risks 47 means that the vast majority of those patients
whose autonomy has actually been violated by their physicians' failure to
obtain informed consent still cannot show the only kind of injury-an adverse
medical outcome-that will support an award of damages under existing
informed consent doctrine.'4 8 It follows that the patient will have difficulty
inducing a contingent-fee lawyer to take the case, however clear the violation
of informed consent may be.
t4 9
Thus, both behavioral data and the structure of tort law provide reasons to
doubt the degree to which informed consent in action actually benefits
patients. 5 ° Studies establish that many, though not all, patients say that they
would prefer more discussion with their physicians about treatment
options.' If patients hold these preferences not only when questioned in the
abstract but in the context of actual treatment and despite the additional costs
146. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 120.
148. The outcome is less clear whether the requisite injury for an informed consent recovery exists
in a situation where surgery was both consented to and successful, but was arguably unnecessary. Such
claims, although unusual, are sometimes asserted. See Caesarean-Birth Verdict, WALL ST. J., June 17,
1993, at B8 ($1.5 million jury verdict in Massachusetts for illness triggered by allegedly unnecessary
caesarean delivery).
149. Although no data on informed consent litigation per se exist, see supra note 105, this conclusion
finds support in empirical studies indicating that medical malpractice claims, of which informed consent
claims are one subset, are unusually difficult for even meritorious plaintiffs to litigate and win, especially
given state "tort reform" legislation. See, e.g., Neil Vidmar, The Unfair Criticism of Medical Malpractice
Juries, 76 JUDICATURE 118, 119-20 (1992) (recent North Carolina study finds low plaintiff success rate and
low median awards). Because informed consent claims often involve loss of the opportunity to choose
(which is often not compensable) rather than an adverse medical outcome or physical harm, see supra note
113 and accompanying text, they are even less attractive to plaintiffs' lawyers than are traditional
malpractice claims. Informed consent claims are often simply tacked on to these traditional malpractice
claims, with the advantage that they do not depend on a showing that the physician provided negligent
treatment. See, e.g., Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, Symposium, Comparing Medical Providers: A
First Look at the New Era of Medical Statistics, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 5, 33 (1992).
150. The methodology of defining and measuring benefits from informed consent is, of course,
controversial. A recent, unpublished review of empirical studies concludes (without citation) that the
benefits of disclosure are "uncertain with respect to the medical injury rate." DON DEWvEES Er AL.,
EXPLORING THE DOMAIN OF ACCIDENT LAW: TAKING THE FACTS SERIOUSLY 3-48 (forthcoming 1994). On
the other hand, some studies indicate that disclosure is associated with increased personal satisfaction. See,
e.g., Judith A. Hall et al., Meta-Analysis of Correlates of Provider Behavior in Medical Encounters, 26
MED. CARE 657 (1988) (review of empirical studies shows postvisit patient satisfaction associated with
amount of information given by physician, but apparently without controlling for patient's medical
outcome). One possible way to measure patient benefits is to seek to determine what patients would be
willing to pay (or otherwise sacrifice) in order to receive various levels of information. This process might
be accomplished through surveys or consumer simulation experiments.
151. See, e.g., Howard Waitzkin, Doctor-Patient Communication: Clinical Implications of Social
Scientific Research, 252 JAMA 2441, 2442 (1984) (physicians severely underestimate amount of
information their patients desire); Kenneth D. Hopper et al., Patients' Attitudes Toward Informed Consent
for Intravenous Contrast Media, 27 INVESTIGATIVE RADIOLOGY 362, 365 (1992) (patients particularly
interested in risks of procedure); Wallace, supra note 145, at 30 (lack of information most common patient
complaint); David B. Spring et al., Written Informed Consent for L V Contrast-Enhanced Radiography:
Patients' Attitudes and Common Limitations, 151 AM. J. ROENTGENOLOGY 1243, 1243 (1988) (90% of
patients surveyed wanted risk information about procedure; 10% did not).
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of more information, then patients should reap at least affective benefits if the
informed consent doctrine in books is more fully implemented.'52
There is another reason, however, to doubt whether patients actually
benefit from the physician-patient dialogue in the way that the doctrine
envisions, and whether even reforming the health care system structurally
would significantly alter this fact. The problems with physician-patient
dialogues that I have described are not peculiar to the United States. They also
appear in Canada, Europe, and Japan--countries whose organization of health
care, political-regulatory structures, and professional culture and practices differ
from ours in many fundamental respects.153 The fact that similar discursive
patterns are universal-or at least are found in highly diverse contemporary
health care systems-strongly implies that these patterns are so deeply rooted
in the psychology and structure of a physician-patient relationship as to be
largely immune to change through legal doctrine or other exogenous factors.
My skepticism about both the benefits of informed consent law in action
and the prospects for the vigorous enforcement and efficacy of the law in
books is not meant to suggest either that the informed consent process has
been wholly meaningless or that it cannot be improved. There is some
evidence that physicians now disclose more to patients than they did in the
past.'54 Moreover, reformers have made a number of useful proposals as to
how informed consent might be made more meaningful and beneficial, and
some interesting experiments have been conducted. 155 In particular, the use
of video presentations augmented by discussion seems very promising,1 56 and
152. See, e.g., Hall et al., supra note 150, at 661.
153. See INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL BENEFrI/RISK FOUNDATION, supra note 143.
154. See, e.g., Paul P. Lee et al., Is Informed Consent Needed for Fluorescein Angiography?, 111
ARCHIVES OPHTHAMOLOGY 327, 327 (1993); see also PAUL S. APPELBAUM Er AL., INFORMED CONSENT:
LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 265-66 (1987) (noting recent efforts for medical students to
improve implementation of informed consent); David A. Kessler, Communicating with Patients About Their
Medications, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1650, 1651-52 (1991) (encouraging physicians to communicate more
meaningfully with patients about prescribed drugs, and noting trend among pharmacists to engage in such
discussions); Novak et al., supra note 131, at 897-98.
155. See, e.g., P.J.D. Dawes et al., Informed Consent: The Assessment of Two Structured Interview
Approaches Compared to the Current Approach, 106 J. LARYNGOLOGY & OTOLOGY 420, 420 (1992)
(structured interview using written information sheet improves patient recall of procedural risks without
increasing preoperative anxiety); David L. Simel & John R. Feussner, A Randomized Controlled Trial
Comparing Quantitative Informed Consent Formats, 44 J. CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 771, 775 (1991)
(patients can use quantitative information to make decisions); Melinda M. Hutson & J. David Blaha,
Patients' Recall of Preoperative Instruction for Informed Consent for an Operation, 73 J. BONE & JOINT
SURGERY 160, 162 (1991) (tutoring of patients may increase recall at moment of informed consent
procedure of risks and benefits); Jon F. Merz et al., Verbal Expressions of Probability in Informed Consent
Litigation, 11 MED. DECISION MAKING 273, 273 (1991) (recommending that physicians give patients
standardized probabilistic definitions in verbal quantitative terms).
156. See, e.g., Michael M. Weinstein, Dr. Video: How Best To Decide What Patients Need, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 13, 1992, at E16 (use of videotape during informed consent discussions reduced number of
patients electing surgery in Denver HMO). In a March 19, 1993, interview conducted on a ski lift (and thus
presumably in a spirit of candor, exhilaration, and full disclosure), an orthopedist told the author that most
of his practice consisted of three distinct operations and that he had purchased, at a cost of $100 each,
videotapes that described each of these operations, which he plays for his patients. Cf. Deborah N. Ader
et al., Information Seeking and Interactive Videodisc Preparation for Third Molar Extraction, 50 J. ORAL
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a third-party strategy utilizing paraprofessionals who are specially trained to
communicate with patients in ways that many physicians apparently find
difficult might also be fruitful.1
5 7
The problem, however, may well go beyond poor techniques and flawed
implementation of the doctrine. As I have suggested, tort law is severely
constrained in its ability to generate the hoped-for benefits from informed
consent on the books. Tort law is particularly impotent when it seeks to alter
behavior in the kind of settings in which informed consent proper is supposed
to occur.158 Physician-patient discussions are conducted in private; little
extrinsic evidence exists to contradict the physician's account. These
discussions are already shaped by other deeply entrenched social forces,
including physicians' superior status and long-established professional
traditions, and patients' anxiety and medical ignorance. The discussions are
documented by forms that courts are reluctant to look behind and thus usually
deem authoritative.'5 9 On the cost side, moreover, most of the changes that
are practicable would require highly compensated professionals to spend more
nontreatment time with patients, an issue to which I now turn.
C. Would a More Demanding Informed Consent Doctrine Be Worth the Cost?
In the previous Sections, I first showed that the informed consent doctrine
in books is more onerous for health care providers than are the analogous
doctrines for product sellers and other risk creators. I then considered the most
plausible arguments supporting this difference and concluded that when these
purported justifications are closely evaluated, they are not
compelling-although the argument based on inequality of information and
MAXILLOFACIAL SURGERY 27 (1992) (interactive videodisc presentations convey information less
successfully than ordinary videotapes, but achieve higher rates of satisfaction among patients). More
generally, better ways of communicating risk information through visual representations other than
videotape can be developed. See infra text accompanying note 198.
157. There are many examples of this third-party approach, including abortion counseling and pre-test
counseling for EIIV infection and other sexually transmitted diseases. For a striking example, see Frederick
Wiseman's prize-winning film, NEAR DEATH, which records painstaking consultations between a
psychiatrist (not the treating physician) and the family of a terminal patient. NEAR DEATH (Exit Films
1989). The Surgeon General's tobacco warnings, see infra notes 206-07, also exemplify a third-party
strategy. See also Steven R. Smith, Mental Health Malpractice in the 1990s, 28 Hous. L. REv. 209, 258
n.302 (1991) (patient advocate could have role in initiating and reevaluating informed consent); Jones,
supra note 132, at 426 (suggesting patient advocates).
158. Cf. Peter H. Schuck, Some Reflections on the Baby M Case, 76 GEo. L.J. 1793, 1808-10 (1988)
(contract law, augmented by regulation, could enforce informed consent values in connection with surrogate
parenting). See generally STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW (1989)
(deterrent potential undermined by ignorance of law, incompetence, discounting of liability threat, and low
penalties); Howard A. Latin, Problem Solving-Behavior and Theories of Tort Liability, 73 CAL. L. REv.
677 (1985) (inattentiveness to task and difficulty of assessing risk limit effectiveness of tort law); Neil L.
Komesar, Injuries and Institutions: Tort Reform, Tort Theory, and Beyond, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 28
(1990) (deterrence depends on how well actors receive incentive signals).
159. See FURROW Er AL., supra note 73, at 377 ('The courts have had little to say about consent
forms."). In many states, legislation reinforces this deference to the consent forms. Id.
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power has some force. In large part, I rejected these justifications because of
both the informed consent gap (i.e., the marked difference between the law in
books and the law in action) and the structural impediments to reducing that
gap significantly through tort law. These impediments suggest that toughening
the law in books by imposing even more demanding dialogic responsibilities
on physicians would not succeed in closing, and might even widen, the
informed consent gap. In this Section, I argue that the costs of attempting to
close the informed consent gap in this manner would be high.
In one view of informed consent, the doctrine's practical consequences are
less important than the values that it instantiates and promotes. From this
Kantian perspective, the rigorous requirement is morally compelled-regardless
of how well or poorly it actually achieves its goals, because the value of
patient autonomy is paramount. This deontological view has driven the
traditional doctrine of informed consent in American courts to a considerable
degree. I do not mean that the courts are wholly indifferent to the cost-
effectiveness of informed consent in practice. Presumably, it is because they
are concerned with costs that courts typically limit the disclosure mandate to
risks that are "material" and not commonly understood, apply a less costly
"objective" test of patients' information needs, recognize a number of
exceptions to the disclosure requirement, and demand that plaintiffs
demonstrate injury causation as well as decision causation. 6 Nevertheless,
the cases evince little systematic judicial interest in the doctrine's actual
consequences, especially its costs. Instead, courts tend to invoke the values of
autonomy and improved decisionmaking and then analyze the implications of
those values, while maintaining a silence on the issue of costs. This mode of
analysis assumes that the costs of advancing these values are either de minimis
or not worth analyzing. 61
Today, however, the policy environment in the United States bears little
resemblance to that which prevailed more than three decades ago, when the
informed consent doctrine was first formulated. 62 In this new environment,
the health care costs associated with legal requirements are simply too
politically salient to be assumed away, especially if the benefits are in doubt.
Concerns about these costs have fundamentally transformed public rhetoric and
political agendas. President Clinton's proposals on national health insurance,
whatever their eventual fate, have already triggered an intense congressional
debate. A major focus of this debate, of course, is the problem of medical
costs, which have been increasing for a long time at rates far in excess of
160. See supra notes 72-95 and accompanying text.
161. See, e.g., Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 333 (Md. 1993) (duty of AIDS-infected surgeon to
disclose); Kerins v. Hartley, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 621 (Ct. App. 1993) (same).
162. The generative decisions were Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1957) and Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1960). An early case, Hunter v. Burroughs, 96
S.E. 360, 366 (Va. 1918), had prefigured such a doctrine in the most general terms.
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inflation in the nonhealth sector of the economy. In 1992, these costs amounted
to approximately $900 billion, consuming 13.9% of the gross domestic
product. 163 U.S. per capita GDP health care expenditures in 1990 exceeded
those of Canada by 15%, Germany by 20%, France by 26%, Japan by 22%,
and the United Kingdom by 40%.' 64 Already the highest in the world by any
measure, these costs are still on a rising trajectory.'65
In devising a politically viable, fiscally sound national health plan,
policymakers confront many poignantly conflicting claims for additional
resources. These include, for example, the claims of approximately thirty-five
million uninsured individuals, the need for pregnancy and maternal care,
neonatal care, childhood disease treatment, long-term care, mental health
services, organ transplantation, heroic life-sustaining measures for the
terminally ill, substance abuse treatment, preventive care, lead paint and (more
controversially) asbestos removal, 166 prescription drugs, and countless other
genuine needs. Policymakers must somehow compromise these claims; they
may have to reject some of these claims altogether.
Choices of this kind allocate scarce resources in ways that inevitably
occasion great suffering or death, putting the moral foundations of social
collaboration at some risk. 67 If such "tragic" choices (as Guido Calabresi
and Philip Bobbitt have characterized them) are now inescapable in health
care, informed consent, like other policies concerned with health care delivery,
should be weighed and balanced against other policies competing for those
resources. As the United States moves from a market-organized and consumer-
driven health care system to one in which patients must cede more of their
autonomy and choice to cost-conscious public payors and regulators, the need
to balance the costs and benefits of informed consent, or at least to maximize
the social return on whatever costs the system incurs, will be even more
compelling. This need exists, moreover, even though the informed consent
process probably accounts for only a tiny fraction of the health care system's
total costs.
68
163. See Sally T. Burner et al., National Health Expenditure Projections Through 2030, HEALTH CARE
FIN. REV., Fall 1992, at 1, 14 (finding that national health expenditures constitute 13.9% of U.S. GDP).
164. George J. Schreiber et al., U.S. Health Expenditure Performance: An International Comparison
and Data Update, HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Summer 1992, at 1, 13.
165. According to one analysis, this cost increase reflects the relatively slow growth in the productivity
of health care services, but high productivity growth in other economic sectors means that less labor time
by health care consumers is needed to pay for these more costly services. See William J. Baumol, Do
Health Care Costs Matter?, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 22, 1993, at 16.
166. See, e.g., B.T. Mossman et al., Asbestos: Scientific Developments and Implications for Public
Policy, 247 SCIENCE 294 (1990) (describing wide variation in riskiness of different types of asbestos fibers
and failure to account for differentiation in public policy discussions).
167. See GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBrrr, TRAGIC CHOICES 17-18 (1978).
168. The same can be said (more or less) of most of the other policies under discussion, and even a
tiny fraction of the whole could amount to a great deal of money. An example is medical malpractice,
which is a prominent target of reform efforts but which accounts for only a small share (an estimated 1%)
of total health care costs. Frank Sloan, Remarks at Vanderbilt University Seminar on Medical Malpractice
(Apr. 15-17, 1993). As it happens, a leading analyst of medical malpractice costs argues that informed
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Conceivably, a system that has grown sufficiently cost-conscious to make
its tragic choices more transparent could opt for an informed consent law that
is more, rather than less, demanding than existing doctrine. For example, a
more cost-conscious system might accept the argument, noted below, that
informed consent could actually reduce health care costs by producing better
treatment decisions and more satisfied patients, who would be less likely to
assert malpractice claims. 69 Alternatively, it might take the view that the
social benefits arising from greater patient autonomy outweigh the doctrine's
costs, or that an even more robust informed consent is needed to
counterbalance the growing bureaucratization and routinization of health care
delivery.
Such a policy choice, however, seems most unlikely. Under a new, more
cost-conscious system, patients who previously were free to choose any
treatment that they wished while still being assured of third-party
reimbursement (say, organ transplantation) will find their choices limited by
budget-driven service rationing, financial constraints, and provident
gatekeepers. In such a system, policymakers and cost-conscious patients and
payors may view as an insupportable extravagance a doctrine requiring
physicians to spend more time engaging in more extensive dialogues with
patients about alternatives that are no longer practically available to them,
dialogues that are (or may seem) resistant to change, 7' that often occur after
the crucial decision has already been made,' 7' and that seem to have little
observable effect on ultimate treatment decisions. They are likely to search
instead for legal and other changes designed to elicit informed consent more
quickly and cheaply, while reaffirming and retaining (if possible) the normative
commitments that the doctrine now represents.
IV. NEXT STEPS
There are a number of ways in which policymakers might conduct this
search. I shall briefly discuss four. They should conduct a systematic cost-
effectiveness analysis of informed consent. They should seek better techniques
for communicating information about treatment risks. They should differentiate
and contextualize informed consent doctrine by distinguishing the varying
consent laws were among the new and expanding liability doctrines that played a significant role in the
increase in malpractice costs during the 1970's. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 105, at 76-
77. This perception, whether justified or not, may have contributed to the distorted impressions of informed
consent law "in the mind" of many physicians. But see Patricia M. Danzon, The Crisis in Medical
Malpractice: A Comparison of Trends in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom and Australia,
18 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 48, 53 (1990) (malpractice claims continuing to rise in United States
despite lack of recent major doctrinal shift).
169. See infra notes 174-75 and accompanying texL
170. KArz, supra note 1, at 28-29.
171. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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significance and consequences of informed consent in diverse settings. And
they should facilitate the ability of organized patient groups and providers to
contract explicitly about the appropriate levels and other features of informed
consent, just as they will be contracting about other aspects of their treatments.
A. Cost-Effectiveness Analysis
Under conditions of scarcity in health care resources, how
demanding-and thus how costly-should the informed consent requirement
be? The analysis in Part MI comparing the doctrine's scope and consequences
in the health care setting with those in other areas of tort law in which
analogous doctrines exist helps to sharpen this question. But because the
question is a normative one, descriptive and comparative analyses alone cannot
fully answer it. In addition, empirical analysis must be conducted and some
difficult normative choices, which will be illuminated but not fully resolved by
that analysis, must be made.
Consider the fact that a more rigorous informed consent doctrine seeking
to produce a more meaningful dialogue between physicians and patients about
treatment decisions is almost certain to increase the information costs
associated with the decisions-mainly the additional time required for high-
priced physicians to communicate with patients about treatment risks, benefits,
and alternatives. The actual magnitude of these additional information costs,
of course, will depend on the size of the "informed consent gap"--the
difference between the law in action and the law in books-that we are
prepared to tolerate. The more we seek to close this gap by more closely
conforming the law in action to the law in books, the higher the information
costs will be. Talk, especially busy doctors' talk, is not cheap. Genuinely
probing conversation, which advocates of the law in the books demand, is
dearer still. This is especially so when each of the parties, albeit for different
reasons, may be deeply ambivalent about conducting it in this manner.
A comprehensive analysis, of course, cannot confine itself to any narrowly
defined conception of cost, such as the direct information costs just discussed.
It must also consider other kinds of costs, which may be more difficult to
measure but at least as important. These include the mental and psychic effort
that patients must expend in order to comprehend the information and deal
with the emotional stress that it may cause, and the effects of the disclosed
information on patients' actual treatment decisions and hence on treatment
outcomes, which represent the costs and benefits that are probably most salient
to patients. 72 Finally, such an analysis must be sensitive to the likelihood
172. This information may cause a patient to make a choice that increases costs to the system (as when
a patient selects additional treatment rather than the "do nothing" option) or one that reduces the system's
costs (as when a terminally ill patient decides to forgo additional life support).
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that some communication that the physician views as a cost may be viewed by
the patient as a benefit.'
Equally important, a comprehensive analysis must consider the benefits of
different levels of information. Some studies indicate, for example, that
patients who repose greater trust in their physicians and those who better
understand their disease processes and therapies actually achieve superior
outcomes. 74 In addition, such patients are less likely to bring malpractice
actions.' 75 They may also experience other benefits, such as greater feelings
of competence and control, that are more difficult to isolate and quantify but
are nonetheless precious.
I can find no published quantitative estimates of the costs or benefits of
informed consent. 176 Indeed, I know of no estimates even of what should be
the most straightforward cost categories, such as the increased physician time
and the associated fees needed to fill the informed consent gap.'7 7 Any
173. This possible disjunction between cost-bearer and beneficiary is all the more reason to organize
the health care payment system so that, consistent with other policy goals, those who perceive and receive
benefits, including information, bear the costs of producing them.
174. Poor physician communication to patients is correlated not only with malpractice claims but, more
importantly, with malpractice incidence. Ellen W. Clayton et al., Doctor-Patient Relationships, in FRANK
A. SLOAN Er AL., SUING FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 59-60, 64-65 (1993); see also Sherrie H. Kaplan et
al., Assessing the Effects of Physician-Patient Interactions on the Outcomes of Chronic Disease, 27 MED.
CARE S110, S122 (Supp. 1989) (physiological and functional condition improved for patients coached to
ask more questions and participate in care decisions); Don A. Rockwell & Frances Pepitone-Rockwell, The
Emotional Impact of Surgery and the Value of Informed Consent, 63 MED. CLINICS N. AM. 1341, 1350
(1979) (arguing that informed consent incorporates psychotherapeutic techniques useful to prevent and/or
treat postoperative psychological complications); Wallace, supra note 145, at 32 (even patients who did not
desire additional information from their physicians exhibited a therapeutic benefit). For the therapeutic
benefit of information conveyance generally, see Lawrence D. Egbert et al., Reduction of Postoperative
Pain by Encouragement and Instruction of Patients, 270 NEw ENG. J. MED. 825, 826 (1964) (patients
informed about postoperative pain and self-relief techniques prior to surgery required significantly less pain
relief medication than patients not given such information). But cf. Terence C. Wade, Patients May Not
Recall Disclosure of Risk of Death: Implications for Informed Consent, 30 MED. SCI. L. 259 (1990) (54%
of cholecystectomy patients did not recall after discharge being informed of risk of death, though they cited
the specific risk of death correctly on preoperative questionnaire; no therapeutic difference between those
who could and could not remember).
175. Robyn S. Shapiro et al., A Survey of Sued and Nonsued Physicians and Suing Patients, 149
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2190, 2194 (1989) (doctors and patients surveyed agreed that improvement in
communication is best way to prevent suits); J.K. Avery, Lawyers Tell What Turns Some Patients Litigious,
MED. MALPRACTICE, July/August 1986, at 35 (insurance defense lawyers cited physician communications
and attitudes as primary factor in 70% of filed claims). But see Marlynn L. May & Daniel B. Stengel, Who
Sues Their Doctors? How Patients Handle Medical Grievances, 24 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 105, 116 (1990)
(patient perception of patient-physician relationship does not predict patient choice to sue); cf. DANZON,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICF, supra note 168, at 76-77 (expansion of informed consent laws in United States
during 1970's led to higher frequency and severity of medical malpractice claims); D. Dewees et al., The
Medical Malpractice Crisis: A Comparative Empirical Perspective, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 217, 244
(1991) (more stringent requirements for informed consent in Canada have significantly increased frequency
of medical malpractice claims).
176. Furthermore, my inquiries to a number of physician organizations have been unavailing. Even
a recent article with a promising title contains no such estimate. See Mark Fajfar, An Economic Analysis
of Informed Consent to Medical Care, 80 GEO. L.J. 1941 (1992).
177. One might begin by using the tapes of conversations from the Waitzkin study, supra note 101,
to ask a panel of respondents about perceived deficiencies in those conversations and what would have been
required to remedy those deficiencies.
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estimate, of course, will be arbitrary and vulnerable to criticism given the lack
of good data, but some initial efforts could produce at least rough orders of
magnitude from which we might begin to assess the doctrine's cost-
effectiveness. While the estimation task will be difficult, there is no reason in
principle why it cannot be done.
The most obvious approach would attempt to measure the time and cost
parameters directly. For example, one might survey physicians frequently
involved in obtaining informed consent and ascertain the average amount of
time consumed by the dialogue under current practice, t78 the imputed cost
for a unit of their time, t7 9 and the number of such dialogues that occur
during a given period. One might then ask physicians (or otherwise estimate)
how much additional time would be required (in some reasonably well-defined
sense) 80  to improve the quality of these dialogues. 8' From this
information, one could begin to develop some aggregate cost estimates for
various reform options.
182
178. See Mark & Spiro, supra note 101, at 778 (time estimates for colonoscopy discussion); Waitzkin,
supra note 101, at 2442 (5% of physician-patient encounter time was spent on general information giving
by physicians).
179. Although physicians are ordinarily paid by procedure, a large component of the fee compensates
for the time required for the procedure.
180. Some of the empirical research on reforming informed consent could be used to develop
operational measures of improvement, such as scores on patient responses to questions designed to elicit
and gauge their recall and comprehension. See supra note 134.
181. One might also compare informed consent practices in fee-for-service and capitation practice
settings. The latter, operating on a fixed fee basis, must absorb the costs of providing informed consent,
at least in the short run, while the former can pass them on to patients in the form of higher fees. If
physicians in capitation plans engage in more meaningful informed consent discussions, such behavior
might indicate that they view doing so as cost-effective. I am indebted to Professor Akhil Amar for this
suggestion.
182. The first step in the analysis of cost-effectiveness would be to estimate the additional time
required to obtain a genuine, meaningful informed consent discussion. Several earlier studies have taken
a stab at this. See, e.g., Mark & Spiro, supra note 101, at 778; Waitzkin, supra note 101, at 2442.
Without any pretense of empirical rigor or analytical precision, I decided to pose this question to
several eminent, ethically reputable surgeons and anesthesiologists of my acquaintance who are associated
with Yale-New Haven Hospital and the Yale University School of Medicine. Each fully subscribes to the
importance of informed consent but each believes (based on many professional discussions and some
readings on the subject) that most of the conversations and form-signings that now pass for informed
consent in the profession are ritualistic and largely meaningless to the patient. I asked them the following
question: Compared to the existing practice of informed consent, how much longer would it take on average
to conduct the kind of meaningful dialogue with patients about the risks of surgery (e.g., infection, drug
side effects, and other possible mishaps) that you believe the doctrine was meant to produce? While
emphasizing that averages are meaningless when dealing with a wide variety of patients with diverse
medical conditions, two of these physicians responded that on average at least fifteen minutes more per
patient would be required. Interview with Dr. Sherwin Nuland, Associate Clinical Professor of Surgery,
Yale University School of Medicine, in New Haven, Conn. (Mar. 5, 1993); Interview with Dr. Jonathan
Katz, supra note 139. A third said that he would not do anything differently and estimates that he averages
forty-five minutes per case on informed consent. Interview with Dr. Richard Gusberg, Professor of Surgery,
Yale University School of Medicine, in New Haven, Conn. (Mar. 5, 1993).
After estimating additional time per procedure, the next step would be to assign a dollar value to that
time, on the theory that although physicians are ordinarily paid by procedure rather than by the hour, the
fees for particular procedures will eventually reflect any additional time required to make consent better
informed. See supra text accompanying notes 100-02. Ideally, one would want the estimate to take account
of the different fees charged for different procedures. Still, a serviceable estimate might nevertheless be
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Another approach would draw on cross-state or cross-national analyses of
the nature and consequences of different informed consent doctrines or
practices in countries whose informed consent laws are more tailored to
conditions of resource scarcity than is ours, but which are otherwise roughly
comparable in terms of standard of living and health care. It might be
instructive, for example, to compare U.S. approaches with those in continental
Europe, 83 in the U.K., 8  and especially in Canada," 5 which shares with
the United States a common law heritage and a similar medical profession,
albeit one that places much more emphasis on primary care and relies on
altogether different financing arrangements. 186 As I noted earlier, cross-
developed by using cruder but more readily available data, say, average surgeons' fees or income, or the
total number of surgical procedures performed in the United States. To the extent that the data permit,
additional refinements should be made. For example, the analysis should distinguish office time from
operating room time, surgical procedures from other medical interventions to which the doctrine ought to
apply, informed consent obtained by surgeons from that obtained by surgical anesthesiologists, and such
direct costs of more meaningful informed consent from any indirect costs such as increased patient anxiety.
See supra text preceding note 172. One might also try to account for the possibility that as patients become
better informed about risks and alternatives, informing them will become less costly. Interview with Dr.
Jay Katz, Elizabeth K. Dollard Professor Emeritus of Law, Medicine and Psychiatry, Yale Law School, in
New Haven, Conn. (June 7, 1993).
183. To generalize, the doctrine in continental European countries sets forth more stringent disclosure
standards than does the rule in the United Kingdom, see infra note 184, but the continental European
approach is still more deferential than the Canterbury standard used in many U.S. states. See Dieter Giesen
& John Hayes, The Patient's Right To Know-A Comparative View, 21 ANGLo-AM. L. REv. 101, 110-12
(1992).
184. The British courts do not recognize a doctrine of informed consent per se; instead, they treat
negligent disclosure simply as one species of medical malpractice. SHEILA MCLEAN, A PATIENT'S RIGHT
To KNoW 102 (1989). In a 1985 House of Lords decision, the United Kingdom pointedly rejected the
"reasonable patient" standard of informed consent that was adopted in the United States in Canterbury v.
Spence, 464 F2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), and that remains dominant here. Instead, it adopted a standard that
essentially demands only the disclosures that a "reasonable physician" would make; she need not conform
to the predominant practice but only to a responsible body of medical opinion. The House of Lords also
endorsed a "therapeutic" nondisclosure privilege. Sidaway v. Board of Governors of Bethlem Royal Hosp.,
[1985] 2 W.L.R. 480. This approach was affirmed in Gold v. Haringey Health Authority, [1987] 3 W.L.R.
649. The Australian doctrine seems more open to subjective standards than the continental European and
closer to that in the more patient-oriented U.S. jurisdictions. Giesen & Hayes, supra note 183, at 121.
Sidaway's narrower conception of informed consent seems inevitable in a system like Britain's, which
long ago decided both to socialize and to limit sharply most health care costs. Having subordinated patients'
preferences to the system's fiscal constraints, the United Kingdom cannot allow those preferences to control
at the level either of informed consent processes or of specific treatment choices. See Robert Schwartz &
Andrew Grubb, Why Britain Can't Afford Informed Consent, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Aug. 1985, at 22-23.
185. Canadian informed consent law more closely resembles that in the United States than that in the
United Kingdom. The leading case is Reibl v. Hughes, 2 S.C.R. (Can. 1980), which firmly placed most
Canadian informed consent doctrine within a negligence framework while also adopting an objective
decision-causation test. Some analysts have attributed some of the increase in medical malpractice claims
in Canada to the standards adopted in Reibl. Danzon, supra note 168 (citing D. DEWEES ET AL., CANADIAN
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LIABILITY: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF RECENT TRENDS (1989)). In a study of
one province, spanning the late 1970's and early 1980's, informed consent claims constituted 0.9% of total
malpractice claims filed with Canadian insurers, and 1% of their costs. Surgery constituted 14.5% and 15%,
respectively; wrong diagnosis 4.1% and 5%, respectively, and unnecessary treatment 0.3% for each. See
LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION IN HEALTH CARE: A REPORT TO THE CONFERENCE OF DEPUTY MINISTERS
OF HEALTH OF THE FEDERAIJPROVINCIALTERRITORIAL REVIEW ON LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION ISSUES
IN HEALTH CARE app. A at 42, tbl. 9 (1990).
186. See, e.g., Theodore R. Marmor & Jerry L. Mashaw, Northern Light: Canada's Lessons for
American Health Care, 3 AM. PROSPECT 18, 18-19 (1990). The fact that so many Canadian physicians
provide primary care makes the informed consent process there somewhat easier to implement because of
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national comparisons of physician-patient interactions in very different health
care systems nevertheless indicate some striking behavioral similarities.1 7
As noted earlier, the outcome of a cost-effectiveness analysis of informed
consent is not preordained. The analysis might condemn the existing "law in
books" version of informed consent envisioned by its most idealistic
proponents, the "law in action" version practiced by busy and often skeptical
physicians and by passive, deferential patients, or both. Such an analysis might
favor a return to professional custom as the standard for disclosure, or a
broader "therapeutic defense," or a narrower definition of "material risk," or
a more rigorous requirement for proving "decision causation." It might argue
instead (or in addition) for an educational strategy in which patients would be
encouraged to question more aggressively. This approach would rely more on
a physician's duty to ascertain and respond fully to patients' actual and
idiosyncratic concerns and less on the physician's duty to cover affirmatively
what she thinks a patient would want to know.'88 A related reform would be
to strengthen the doctrine by requiring the physician to ascertain and ensure the
patient's understanding, rather than defining the obligation simply in terms of
reasonable disclosure.8 9 For each of these approaches, it would of course be
important to assess the likely costs of securing these benefits.
The analysis might have a number of other outcomes. Notwithstanding the
magnitude of the informed consent gap, the analysis might affirm the
desirability of existing informed consent practice if the law in action turns out
to be a better guide to the level of informed consent that society actually
prefers and is willing to pay for than the law in books. In this view, the
informed consent gap would not necessarily be regarded as a cause for regret;
their more regular contact with patients.
187. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
188. See Joseph Goldstein, For Harold Lasswell: Some Reflections on Human Dignity, Entrapment,
Informed Consent, and the Plea Bargain, 84 YALE LJ. 683, 690-98 (1975) (elaborating on this point).
189. While most courts accept a signed informed consent form to justify a presumption that "the
patient understood and consented" to the procedure, e.g., Hondroulis v. Schumacher, 553 So. 2d 398, 417
(La. 1988); cf Cross v. Trapp, 294 S.E.2d 446, 460 (W. Va. 1982) (holding that form must be sufficiently
detailed for presumption to hold), some courts have at least "left the door open" to refuse to apply this
presumption. Meisel, supra note 94, at 117; see also Demers v. Gerety, 515 P.2d 645, 648 (N.M. Ct. App.
1973) (holding that patient's grogginess from medication and later inability to recall signing consent form
established lack of competency to consent). One court has found that a patient's failure to read the form
before signing does not constitute contributory negligence. Keomaka v. Zakaib, 811 P.2d 478, 486 (Haw.
App. Ct.), cert. denied, 841 P.2d 1075 (Haw. 1991). Some legislation requires that information be provided
in reasonably comprehensible language. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1704.5 (West 1990)
(requiring "written summary in layman's language and in a language understood by the patient" of
procedure, alternatives and risks for breast cancer treatment); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 7.70.060(l) (West
1992) (requiring that procedure, alternatives and risks be explained in "language the patient could
reasonably be expected to understand").
Though patient understanding has seldom been addressed by courts in ordinary informed consent
litigation, the patient's ability to "understand, or knowingly and intelligently act upon" medical information
is the touchstone of inquiry into patient competency to consent. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.5(c)
(West 1984). Compare In re Fadley, 205 Cal. Rptr. 572, 576 (Ct. App. 1984) (patient determined unable




instead, it would be valued as a source of information about actual costs and
benefits, information that (as we have seen) is otherwise difficult to obtain. 90
On the other hand, as noted earlier, the analysis might reveal that the advocates
of the law in the books are correct-that closing the informed consent gap,
either with a more demanding doctrine or more effective enforcement of the
existing one, would in fact produce autonomy, educational, and outcome-
enhancing benefits that are worth the costs.
Whatever the outcome, we would at least have paid the informed consent
doctrine the compliment of taking it seriously, of attempting to think
systematically about how to maximize its effectiveness. Sadly, the organized
medical profession, particularly the American Medical Association (AMA), has
failed to take up this challenge energetically. Rather than facilitating a
constructive appraisal of informed consent doctrine, the AMA and most
specialty organizations have responded to informed consent in a reactive,
defensive fashion. They have generally been passive, acquiescent spectators
and occasional critics, not self-motivated, constructive reformers.' 9'
This grudging stance was not inevitable. When informed consent doctrine
was gaining ground, the AMA and specialty organizations could have taken the
initiative and used their considerable prestige and expertise to develop
professional standards of good medical practice with respect to informed
consent. 192 By drawing upon the profession's understanding of physician-
patient relationships, its ethical commitment to the primacy of its patients'
interests, its capacity to adduce scientific evidence about the costs and benefits
of informed consent in different settings, its familiarity with alternative
techniques for communicating with patients, and its ability to monitor
compliance with the doctrine, these standards might well have promoted the
goals and implementation strategies for which I argue below. These include
using comparative risk information, contextualizating and differentiating
informed consent requirements, and encouraging patient-friendly contracting
190. See Peter Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 DUKE L. 1,
46 (1992).
191. See Jay Katz, Informed Consent Must It Remain a Fairy Tale?, 12-13 (no date) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author). Some medical specialty groups, such as the American College of
Physicians and the American Fertility Society, have been more receptive to informed consent than has the
AMA. These groups, moreover, may actually be more representative of the profession today than is the
AMA, whose membership now constitutes only about half of the physicians in the United States. Telephone
interview with Dr. Robert Levine, Professor of Internal Medicine and Chairman of the Human
Investigations Committee, Yale University School of Medicine, New Haven, Conn. (Sept. 30, 1993); see
also KATZ, supra note 1, at 23-25 (tracing history of AMA's response to informed consent). For the
AMA's official position on informed consent, see AMERICAN MED. ASS'N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS,
ANNOTATED CURRENT OPINIONS § 8.08 (1992).
192. For example, after the California Supreme Court's highly controversial decision imposing liability
on psychiatrists for failing to control dangerous patients, Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d
334 (Cal. 1976), professional organizations developed guidelines and training materials to assist
psychiatrists and other mental health professionals in implementing the decision. See Paul S. Appelbaum,
Implications of Tarasofffor Clinical Practice, in THE POTENTIALLY VIOLENT PATIENT AND THE TARASOFF
DECISION IN PSYCHIATRIC PRACTICE 94-108 (James C. Beck ed., 1985).
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about informed consent. But instead of enthusiastically endorsing the informed
consent principle and then teaching physicians how to apply it in medically
and socially fruitful ways, the organized profession has largely abdicated this
crucial creative function to legal institutions that are relatively ill-situated to
perform it: private tort litigation conducted by self-interested litigants on the
basis of narrow, often atypical fact situations, and adjudicated by courts and
juries that know little about the complexities of medical practice. 93 If the
medical profession is unhappy with the law of informed consent (as it
apparently is), it partly has itself to blame.
B. Communicating Risk Information
The principal goals of informed consent doctrine-to promote and protect
patient autonomy and to improve the quality of both patients' and physicians'
treatment decisions--cannot be achieved unless the information about the risks
associated with various treatment (and nontreatment) alternatives is reliable 94
and is communicated in a fashion that is intelligible and meaningful to
patients. This much is obvious. Nevertheless, as already noted, the studies and
commentary on informed consent in action suggest that it often fails even this
minimal test. Many physicians discuss risk in a more or less perfunctory
manner and without much regard to how well the patient comprehends the
information. Many patients appear to understand little of the risk information
and, shortly after the discussion, to recall even less. 95
While many factors contribute to this failure, an important one is the
language and concepts that physicians use to characterize the risks to patients.
The physician's options are limited, and each is problematic to some degree.
Should she employ general terms connoting the magnitude of the risk
(characterizing it, for example, as "high," "low, .... modest," "insignificant"), the
patient will have little basis for knowing what the physician means by this and
thus for making a refined risk assessment. Instead, the physician might attempt
to use more specific language, employing more exact quantitative measures
(expressing risk, for example, as a numerical percentage or statistical
probability). Such language, however, may create a spurious and misleading
impression of precision, while its abstractness-its remoteness from any
referent that is real or palpable to the patient-may render it useless as a
practical tool of rational decisionmaking. Alternatively, the physician may
retreat to a more ambiguous formulation of the risk (a statement, for example,
193. One might also look to the medical schools and teaching hospitals to instruct new physicians in
how to communicate more effectively with patients. Although certain physician disclosure patterns have
indeed changed over time, see supra note 131, medical education may not be as effective in altering these
patterns as one might hope. See supra note 143.
194. See supra text accompanying note 84.
195. See supra notes 129-41 and accompanying text.
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that a medication "may" cause abdominal bleeding), but such a formulation,
while true enough, gives little or no guidance to the patient.
But the inadequacy of these conventional ways of talking about risks goes
well beyond the difficulties of describing the magnitude of a risk to individuals
who are not accustomed to thinking quantitatively about risk.196 To the
patient, the risk's nature and quality-the kind of pain she may feel or the loss
of function she may suffer, for example-may be even more salient. These risk
attributes, however, are even more difficult for the physician to convey because
they entail much that is either ineffable or highly subjective. Under the best of
circumstances, then, communicating effectively about risk is inherently
problematic. When individuals who are trained not as dialogicians but as
scientists must attempt in a busy, time-constrained clinical context to
communicate complex risk information to anxious patients who are not
accustomed to stochastic modes of thinking, it is hardly surprising that failure
is so common.
Still, of all the formidable obstacles to genuine informed consent in health
care, this one seems relatively tractable to reform. To make risk information
more meaningful to patients, physicians need not transform their self-
conceptions or roles, nor incur new time or other costs; they need only to
change how they describe risk to patients. Suppose that physicians were to
characterize risks to patients not in one of the absolute, more or less
quantitative forms mentioned above but rather (or in addition) in explicitly
comparative terms-that is, in terms that encourage the patient to assess the
medical risk in light of other risks that are more familiar to her, risks that she
has some basis for, and experience in, evaluating. For example, the physician
might compare the medical risk to the risk of certain types of common
accidents or other adverse outcomes (e.g., collisions from driving at night, lung
cancer from smoking, complications from drinking alcohol while pregnant)
about which patients are more accustomed to appraising and making explicit
or implicit choices. Might patients find this kind of information more
assimilable and meaningful? Would it enhance the rationality of their
assessments of medical risks and, hence, improve the process and substance
of informed consent?
While answering these questions in the affirmative, I acknowledge that
formulating and applying comparative risk information is problematic. I do not
mean to suggest that how people perceive and assess the risks they encounter
in everyday life are, or should be, dispositive of their decisions about medical
risks. Quite the contrary. A threshold issue concerns whether accurate
comparative risk information can be made available to physicians in a form
that they can then use in their discussions with patients. Currently, most
196. See the discussion and sources cited in STEPHEN G. BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE:
TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION (1993).
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physicians are probably ill-equipped to make risk comparisons unless they are
supplied with the underlying comparative data. Indeed, even "experts" are
subject to many of the cognitive errors concerning risk that laypeople,
including patients, are likely to commit. 97 Fortunately, however, analysts
who seek to improve public perceptions and assessments of risk are
increasingly compiling and publishing this kind of information, usually in order
to demonstrate how irrational such assessments can be when they are not
conducted in a more comparative, contextualized framework.' 98
There is no reason in principle why health care physicians cannot be
supplied with comparative risk information that is systematically designed to
be used in conversations with patients. Nor would the information supplied to
physicians have to be particularly compendious or complex. At a minimum,
the number of comparisons need be no larger than the number of descriptive
categories that physicians already use in discussing risk with patients. If a
physician would ordinarily classify medical risks in, say, four relatively
imprecise categories (as very low, low, medium, or high, for example) for
purposes of conversing with a patient, she need only supply the patient with
four sets of comparisons in order to make that conversation more meaningful
to the patient than it would have been otherwise-although more
discriminating risk categories (and hence more meaningful comparisons) would
probably be even better. Alternatively, if the physician would otherwise discuss
a medical risk with a patient by assigning a specific statistical probability to
the possible outcome in question, then only one set of comparisons is needed
to improve the quality of this discussion.
Supplying comparative risk information to patients entails additional
dangers. Even if the physician possesses the relevant comparative risk
information, her attempts to translate medical risks into other kinds of risks
might nevertheless confuse and perhaps mislead patients. After all, attitudes
toward the acceptability of different risks vary from person to person. Indeed,
they also vary for any given individual, depending on many factors: the source
of the risk, whether the individual thinks that it is under her control and thus
a matter of voluntary choice, its novelty or familiarity, its catastrophic
potential, its painfulness, the possible benefits to be gained by incurring it, its
relation to self-identity and morality, and the time when the feared outcome
197. See JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 24, at 133-51.
198. In a recent article, for example, the authors present various causes of mortality in just such a
form, explicitly comparing the annual death rate per million from asbestos exposure in schools (0.005-
0.093) to the rate for whooping cough vaccination (I to 6); aircraft accidents (6); high school football (10);
childhood drowning (27); pedestrians, from motor vehicle accidents (32); accidents to children in the home
(60); and long-term smoking (1200). Mossman et al., supra note 166, at 299, tbl. 2. This example, as well
as other analogous ones, are discussed in BREYER, supra note 196, at 13. See also Bruce N. Ames et al.,
Ranking Possible Carcinogenic Hazards, 236 SCIENCE 271 (1987); Samuel S. Epstein & Joel B. Swartz,
Technical Comment, Carcinogenic Risk Estimation, 240 SCIENCE 1043 (1988); Bruce N. Ames & Lois S.
Gold, Response, 240 SCIENCE 1045 (1988) (responding to Epstein and Swartz).
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will occur.199 Simple equivalences, therefore, are likely to be incomplete; an
assertion that the risk from a particular medical procedure is lower than, say,
the risk of dying in an automobile accident or the risk of contracting cancer
from the stratospheric radiation encountered in flying may raise as many
questions for the patient as it answers. Comparative risk information may also
be incomplete and thus potentially misleading if the comparisons relate
primarily to a risk's magnitude rather than to its more qualitative dimensions,
which may be more important. Such comparisons might exacerbate the already
strong tendency of "hard" aspects of risk information, such as magnitude, to
eclipse the "softer" ones, such as quality-of-life effects.
While conceding these hazards in dispensing comparative risk information,
one must also acknowledge that the risk discussions that now pass for
informed consent are very unsatisfactory in advancing genuine patient
autonomy and rational decisionmaking. Given this status quo, it is difficult to
escape the conclusion that discussing risk in comparative terms would, on
balance, help the patient think more clearly about medical risks before giving
or withholding her consent to treatment. As the quantity and quality of
comparative risk information increases, those with a stake in enhancing the
informed consent process-health care payors, consumer organizations, and
provider groups-should exploit that information by customizing it to the
needs of the informed consent process, making it available to clinicians in
user-friendly formats, and helping them to deploy it in their dialogues with
patients. In doing so, these groups can draw upon recent work that presents
quantitative and comparative information in imaginative ways to facilitate
greater understanding by people not accustomed to thinking numerically or
statistically.20°
The infusion of comparative risk information into physician-patient
discussions is one technique to enrich an informed consent process that is, by
most accounts, impoverished by a lack of context within which patients can
exercise meaningful choice about difficult options. But the goal of further
contextualizing informed consent-both the process and the legal doctrine that
regulates it-is one that can be pursued in a number of other ways as well.
The following two subsections suggest several additional approaches.
C. Contextualizing and Differentiating Informed Consent
We have seen that courts (and to some extent, legislatures) have insisted
on more meaningful informed consent in medical treatment while tolerating
199. See generally WILLIAM V. LOWRANCE, OF ACCEPTABLE RISK: SCIENCE AND THE
DETERMINATION OF SAFETY 75-102 (1976).
200. See, e.g., EDWARD TUFTE, THE VISUAL DISPLAY OF QUANTITATIVE INFORMATION (1983). Citing
Tufte, Carol Rose makes a related point in connection with the rhetoric of environmental protection. Carol
M. Rose, Environmental Lessons, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. (forthcoming 1994).
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less demanding-but still robust, by traditional standards-forms of consent
in product sales and other areas of risk creation. This doctrinal heterogeneity
bespeaks a recognition that the notion of consent has different meanings and
normative resonances in different contexts. Unfortunately, this recognition has
not always penetrated the domain of informed consent proper, where the
doctrine remains largely monolithic and noncontextual (except insofar as it
employs "reasonableness" terms and contains certain exceptions to the general
duty to disclose). In this respect, at least, the Supreme Court of California's
very recent Arato decision calling for and evidencing a "sensitivity to context"
is a welcome development. 20'
The ongoing cigarette litigation vividly illustrates the importance of
contextualizing informed consent. 20 2 Despite decades of litigation and
unusually strong evidence that the cigarette manufacturers' products have
contributed substantially to the approximately 400,000 deaths annually that the
Surgeon General attributes to smoking, the cigarette industry has managed to
defeat these claims almost completely;0 3 the defendants still have yet to pay
a single cent in damages.2" In the cases that have gone to trial, the
industry's success has rested largely on defenses of assumed risk and
contributory fault, which in this context amount to much the same thing:
informed consent. It is remarkable that the industry was able to escape liability
during a decade in which health consciousness grew rapidly and juries
frequently imposed expansive tort liability on "deep-pocket" defendants whom,
like the cigarette manufacturers, they found to have caused great harm.205
The manufacturers' success in this litigation was not at all preordained.
Plaintiffs have deployed powerful arguments against them, such as the
addictive qualities of nicotine, the blandness and inconspicuousness of the
health warnings, and the expensive advertising campaigns depicting the
glamour, sexuality, and athletic vigor of smokers. The plaintiffs' defeats testify
not only to the adamantine resistance of the industry and the resourcefulness
of its well-financed lawyers, but also to the vitality of consent as a normative
commitment among American jurors-and presumably among the American
people in general.
201. Arato v. Avedon, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 131, 139 (1993); see also notes 71-90 and accompanying text.
202. See generally Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN.
L. REV. 853 (1992) (noting absence of any significant award to plaintiffs during 35 years of tobacco
litigation).
203. The exception is Wilks v. American Tobacco Co., No. 91-12, 355(B)(W), 1993 WL 325136
(Miss. Cir. May 11, 1993) (holding cigarette manufacturers strictly liable in wrongful death action on
ground that cigarettes are defective and unreasonably dangerous as matter of law).
204. See David Margolick, Judge Says Hazards Make Cigarettes Defective by Law, N.Y. TIMES, May
13, 1993, at A14 ("No plaintiff in a health-related case has ever collected from the tobacco industry.");
Rabin, supra note 202, at 854 n. II (noting two "close misses").
205. AUDREY CHIN & MARK A. PETERSON, DEEP POCKETS, EMPTY POCKETS: WHO WINS IN COOK
COUNTY JURY TRIALS (1985).
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We can fairly infer from this line of verdicts, then, a set of public
perceptions about the conditions under which genuine consent-consent
conceived as legally, and perhaps morally, compelling-can be imputed to
individuals. At least where the plaintiffs had smoked after 1964 (when the
famous Surgeon General's report was issued)2 6 or 1965 (when Congress
mandated health warnings),2°7 juries implicitly found that some or all of the
following conditions existed. At the time of consumption, smokers were
reasonably well informed about the risk of cancer.03 Widespread public
discussion, risk premia for life and health insurance, and growing social stigma
further signalled this risk. Smokers' decisions to take the risk were not only
informed choices, but were voluntary (that is, not compelled by addiction) and
repeated. Viable alternatives to those choices existed (e.g., total cessation,
reduced consumption, and less risky brands). Moreover, many similarly
situated smokers selected those alternatives. Finally, smokers received
something of value-namely physical and psychological satisfaction-in return
for their choice. By trading this satisfaction off against the risk of injury, they
may have exercised poor judgment (in the observer's view) but it was a
judgment to which they could fairly be held, as they gained something they
wanted for a risk that they appreciated. Although we cannot know precisely
what was in the minds of jurors who have exculpated the industry, public
opinion polls indicate that their conclusion is widely shared." 9
Juries' willingness to find consent and thus deny liability under these
conditions demonstrates their refusal to override smokers' individual choices
in pursuit of public health goals. Juries have thus been reluctant to use tort law
to require cigarette manufacturers to internalize the social costs of smoking but
instead -have seemed to favor using tort law to emphasize individuals' right to
smoke and their corresponding blameworthiness and financial responsibility for
the resulting harms they risk.210 This propensity is not unique to cigarette
litigation. For example, I noted in Part I that leading courts often uphold the
assumed risk defense in recreational risk contexts.21n Decisions denying
206. See PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, PUB. No. 1103,
SMOKING AND HEALTH: REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE
PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE (1964), cited in Rabin, supra note 202, at 855 n.12.
207. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 4, 79 Stat. 282,
283 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1988)). This legislation was followed by the Public
Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, which banned the advertising of cigarettes on television and radio.
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 2, 84 Stat. 87-88 (1970) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1335 (1988)).
208. Indeed, there is empirical evidence that they systematically overestimate the risk. See Viscusi,.
supra note 121, at 1259.
209. See Who Smokes, Whose Responsibility, AM. ENTERPRISE, May-June 1993, at 102 (83% of
respondents feel that tobacco companies should not be held responsible for smoking-related deaths).
210. Rabin, supra note 202, at 876-77 (distinguishing between public health perspective and individual
rights perspective on allocating risks from smoking).
211. See supra note 50.
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recovery for injuries to professional rescuers212 also suggest that courts are
willing to sacrifice possible health gains on the altar of individual rights.
Conflicting approaches to cases involving injuries related to the failure to use
seat belts, however, indicate the courts' continuing ambivalence on the
question of personal responsibility for risky choices where important public
health costs are involved.2t3
These cases offer an important lesson and a strategic opportunity for
policymakers seeking to reform informed consent doctrine. Policymakers
should ask what it is about these and other risk contexts that induces ordinary
citizens (jurors) to conclude that society should impute informed consent to the
victims' choices and behaviors, even in the face of grave individual harm and
suffering, large social costs, and clear evidence of the defendant's causal
contribution.
Although this is a difficult question, it is one that, like the cost-
effectiveness question, can indeed be answered, at least in principle. A
satisfactory answer would include the kind of factors present in the cigarette
cases and would help policymakers to evaluate informed consent doctrine and
to refine its scope, tailoring it to more empirically based judgments about
public attitudes regarding individual responsibility. Such an inquiry might lead
policymakers to develop a more contextualized, hence differentiated, informed
consent doctrine. Instead of the current unitary doctrine, there might be several
doctrines with different requirements for different treatment and choice
contexts. The doctrines might vary in their obligations according to the nature
of the treatment, the setting in which it occurs, the number and type of
alternatives that are practically available, the degree of medical uncertainty, the
special capacities or vulnerabilities of the patient, and perhaps other variables.
A recent study, for example, indicates that patients retain, for long periods
and with stunningly accurate recall, information that their obstetricians provide
about risks, tests, and alternatives.2 4 This finding contrasts sharply with
many other studies, which reveal that patients in other contexts recall little,
even just after the medical intervention.1 5 If, as seems likely, the mother's
happiness about the medical procedure (her child's birth) distinguishes this
informed consent context from most others (in which the patient may wish to
forget the procedure and everything associated with it), the distinction vividly
illustrates how strongly the efficacy of informed consent depends on context
and suggests how valuable a more differentiated legal doctrine could be.
212. See Gary Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End, supra note 16, at 672-73.
213. Compare, e.g., Lowe v. Estate Motors, 410 N.W.2d 706 (Mich. 1987) (failure to wear seat belt
evidence of plaintiff's negligence) with LaHue v. General Motors Corp., 716 F. Supp. 407 (W.D. Mo.
1989) (failure to wear seat belt not assumed risk and, even if negligent, not a defense to claim of vehicle
defect) and Forsberg v. Volkswagen of America, 769 F. Supp. 33 (D.N.H. 1990) (failure to wear seat belt
not relevant to decedent's misconduct or plaintiff's comparative fault or failure to mitigate).
214. Githens et al., supra note 136, at 7-8.
215. See Meisel & Roth, supra note 129, at 288-95.
[Vol. 103: 899
Rethinking Informed Consent
To be sure, the doctrine need not be as particularistic and fact-dependent
as the number of relevant variables mentioned above suggests. A legal doctrine
can become so fine-grained, its applicability so dependent on factors peculiar
to each case, that it loses all predictability. Nevertheless, it should be possible
to combine the most important variables in order to identify and define a small
number of stylized contexts that warrant distinctive legal treatment.216
Social policy, for example, should impute informed consent in the case of
mass vaccines more readily than in the case of silicone breast implants. With
vaccines, the risks are exceedingly low (although occasionally serious), the
benefits are large, a patient's choice can affect numerous third parties, and the
dialogic possibilities are limited.17 With implants, on the other hand, the
risk-benefit ratio is more controversial, the choice is highly personal and
private and does not directly affect others, and the dialogic opportunities are
relatively great. t8 In the latter situation, moreover, physicians might be
encouraged to use third-party interlocutors who are especially sensitive to
women's special concerns about implants. 19  More generally, a
contextualized informed consent doctrine might appropriately distinguish
between elective and nonelective treatments,220 between the informed consent
duties owed by a patient's family physician and those owed by a hospital-
based anesthesiologist or tertiary care subspecialist who encounters the patient
only fleetingly,22' and between treatment through a single medical event such
as surgery and treatment occurring over a long period of time.2"
Other distinctions should be considered as well. The issue of unnecessary
surgery, for example, is ripe for analysis from an informed consent perspective.
216. As an example of what such an inquiry might produce, consider Dr. Katz's suggestion that four
specialized doctrines be established, each conforming to well defined subgroups of medical practice that
merit different types of physician-patient dialogue. His subgroups are: (1) relatively minor, time-limited
disorders involving relatively low-risk treatments; (2) acute disorders that require a physician to intervene
immediately and to keep the patient relatively anxiety-free; (3) elective procedures or situations in which
many treatment and nontreatment options are available and the decision is not rushed; and (4) conditions
in which prognosis is dire and fatal outcome is a likely prospect. Jay Katz, Physician-Patient Encounters
"On a Darkling Plain," 9 W. NEV ENG. L. REv. 207, 221-22 (1987).
217. Given the distinct characteristics of the vaccination context, Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498
F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974), becomes difficult to justify. In Reyes, the court
held that the vaccine manufacturer was under a duty to warn consumers of the risk of injury even though
the vaccine in that case was highly effective in preventing polio and carried a risk of only a very few polio
cases per million. Id. at 1282, 1295.
218. The "learned intermediary" doctrine, which requires manufacturers of medical devices to warn
physicians, but not patients, of the possible dangers of their products, has been applied by courts in the
context of silicone breast implants. This doctrine thus places an extra and perhaps even exclusive burden
on the physician to inform the patient. See, e.g., Toole v. McClintock, 778 F. Supp. 1543, 1547 (M.D. Ala.
1991) (applying "learned intermediary" doctrine to context of silicone breast implants); Lee v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., 721 F. Supp. 89 (1. Md. 1989) (same).
219. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
220. But cf. Pauscher v. Iowa Methodist Medical Ctr., 408 N.W.2d 355, 360 (Iowa 1987) (rejecting
this distinction).
221. For development of this distinction, see NULAND, supra note 20, at 258-61, 265-67; Howard
Brody, Transparency: Informed Consent in Primary Care, HASTINGS CENTER REP., SeptJOct. 1989, at 5.
222. Brody, supra note 221, at 7-9; Levine, supra note 15, at 1230-31.
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There may be some situations in which physicians should be required to
disclose not merely the existence of a reasonable nonsurgical alternative (a
disclosure required under existing doctrine), but also the fact, bearing on the
necessity for the procedure, that the surgery rate for it is much lower in other
countries with comparable standards of health care. Notable examples of this
disparity are the far higher rates of elective hysterectomies, caesarean
deliveries, and tonsillectomies in the United States than in other such countries
despite the failure of these higher rates to produce significantly better medical
outcomes.223 Whether to require disclosure of the disparity in such situations
should probably depend on how clear and unequivocal the data are. If the
differential surgery rates are either uncertain or subject to plausible alternative
explanations, requiring disclosure of the differentials (as distinct from
disclosure of the existence of the nonsurgical alternative) may simply confuse
or mislead the patient.
D. Contracting About Levels of Informed Consent
This kind of contextualized differentiation is attractive precisely because
informed consent is a normative variable, not an empirical constant. Questions
about what constitutes meaningful informed consent and how much of it is
desirable cannot be satisfactorily answered in the abstract or even by recourse
to research findings or reasoned intuitions about the psychology of
decisionmaking. It also depends on social judgments about the efficacy of
different legal and regulatory regimes, about the conditions that justify
imposing responsibility on individuals for their choices, and about the
appropriate balance between the costs and benefits to different people of
different levels of information about different issues in different settings.
We have seen how informed consent doctrine might be affected by the
various ways in which legal policymakers, operating under certain value
systems or resource constraints, might strike this balance. We have also seen
how different treatment contexts might warrant different informed consent
223. See H. David Banta & Stephen B. Thacker, The Case for Reassessment of Health Care
Technology: Once Is Not Enough, 264 JAMA 235 (1990) (calling for continual comparison of medical
technologies to assure optimal effectiveness); J.P. Bunker, Elective Hysterectomy: Pro and Con, 295 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 264 (1976) (discussing necessity, risks, and rates of hysterectomies in United States); Richard
C. Dicker et al., Hysterectomy Among Women of Reproductive Age: Trends in the United States, 1970-1978,
248 JAMA 323 (1982) (discussing regional and socioeconomic differences in hysterectomy operations in
United States); J.E. Wennberg et al., Changes in Tonsillectomy Rates Associated with Feedback and
Review, 59 PEDIATRICS 821 (1977) (discussing decline in tonsillectomy rates in Vermont following
feedback and review); Pieter E. Treffers et al., Home Births and Minimal Medical Interventions, 264 JAMA
2203 (1990) (discussing low rate of medical intervention in obstetrical care in the Netherlands). See
generally LYNN PAYER, MEDICINE AND CULTURE: VARIETIES OF TREATMENT IN THE UNITED STATES,
ENGLAND, WEST GERMANY AND FRANCE 124-26, 183 (1988). For a comparison of surgical and hospital
practices in two similar urban settings in the northeastern United States, see John E. Wennberg et al., Are
Hospital Services Rationed in New Haven or Over-Utilized in Boston?, 1987 LANCET 1185 (finding striking
differences in some surgery rates, hospital utilization, and costs).
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regimes. This variability, however, goes much farther. It extends to individual
preferences. Individuals are at least as likely as policymakers to differ
concerning how they value the information and dialogue that informed consent
rules encourage but cannot assure. As some commentators have observed,
some patients seem to prefer leaving some or all medical treatment decisions
to their physicians, accepting their ignorance about the risks they face but
placing trust in their physicians to "do the right thing" for them.224 Others
appear to act in the same way even though they may in fact simply be too
intimidated or anxious to behave otherwise. Still others-I call them (us)
"information junkies"-more closely approximate the conventional "rational
consumer" model of decisionmaking, treating medical treatment decisions more
or less like other consumption decisions with respect to the information sought.
In recognition of this diversity, the informed consent analogues in other areas
of tort law-product warnings and especially assumed risk-are highly
differentiated. Within very broad limits, the law permits sellers and buyers, risk
creators and risk bearers, to define by contract the information and risk levels
that (all things considered) they prefer.2"
The law of informed consent in health care could not be more different in
this respect. With some relatively narrow exceptions,226 the law treats all
patients and physicians the same; it posits an abstracted, objectively defined
"prudent patient" as the consumer of information and the maker of choices,
and conforms ll physicians' legal obligations to this uniform abstraction. For
these reasons, current law might not enforce contract terms providing for an
informed consent standard less demanding than that which the law now
imposes. In rejecting such terms, a court would probably argue categorically
that a patient's pre-illness decision to forgo information must be even less
well-informed than a decision about treatment made by the patient after illness
strikes.
Like the "reasonable person" standard and other objective standards in tort
law, the existing uniform approach to informed consent has two virtues: it is
cheaper to know and to administer, and it seeks to protect patients against
gross inequalities of bargaining power vis-h-vis providers. But a doctrine that
treats all patients and physician-patient relationships as essentially
homogeneous when in fact they are not exacts a price. Specifically, the law
requires a level of informed consent that is different from the level that many
consumers or groups of consumers want and for which they would be willing
to pay if the choice were presented to them. The existing doctrine, then, suffers
224. See Mark & Spiro, supra note 101; Interview with Dr. Nuland, supra note 182.
225. Examples include product warranties, limitations or disclaimers of liability by service providers
and insurance contracts.
226. See Pauscher v. Iowa Methodist Medical Ctr., 408 N.W.2d 355, 360 (Iowa 1987); see supra text
accompanying note 96.
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from an ironic, if endemic, vice: it deprives patients of choice in the name of
choice.
As the health care system becomes more highly organized, however, and
large group purchasers of health care acquire a degree of monopsonistic power
and act as proxies for their patient members, both reasons for uniformity in the
level of informed consent begin to lose whatever force they have. Uniformity
in such circumstances ceases to be a virtue and power inequalities are reduced,
perhaps even eliminated. Where those conditions exist, the law should permit
such groups to contract with providers over the appropriate features of
informed consent,227 just as they are now free (within very broad limits) to
bargain over the composition of the benefits package, the cost of care,
credentialing of providers, freedom of choice with respect to providers, and
numerous other elements of health care service delivery. Providers and patient
groups might bargain over a variety of informed consent policies: standard
procedures for physician-patient dialogues, options for more (or less) intensive
discussions, the kinds of disclosures to be made, the presence of family
members, the use of third-party interlocutors, the consent forms to be used,
alternative dispute resolution, the level of damages in the event of a violation,
institutional liability, and many other variables.
In order to facilitate such bargains, the law need not regulate them; it need
only make clear its willingness to enforce their terms under appropriate
circumstances. For example, the courts that uphold patients' claims despite
contractual waivers of liability commonly stress their discomfiture with
provisions like the one in Tunkl that exculpate the provider from any liability
whatsoever. 8 Provisions that do not go so far but instead simply alter the
procedures and standards governing the communication or the parameters of
any resulting litigation such as the level of damages may, and in my view
should, fare better in the courts.229 Such provisions should certainly be
acceptable if the patient belonged to an organization that can truly be said to
have represented the interests of patients as a group.230 The provisions should
also be upheld, however, if they can plausibly be said to have advanced the
227. Some other commentators support contracting over levels of informed consent. See Clark C.
Havighurst, Prospective Self-Denial: Can Consumers Contract Today To Accept Health Care Rationing
Tomorrow?, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1755, 1787 n.80 (1992); Shultz, supra note 75, at 281-83; cf. RUBIN, supra
note 38, at 75-77 (proposing contracting about levels of damages from medical malpractice generally
without specific discussion of informed consent); Margaret Farrell, Revisiting Roe v. Wade: Substance and
Process in the Abortion Debate, 68 IND. L.J. 269, 361 (1993) (advocating consensual process model of
constitutional adjudication "permit[ting] different bargains to be struck in different courts by different
parties.").
228. See Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963); see also supra note 43 and
accompanying text.
229. See, e.g., Mehlman, supra note 72, at 409-12. See generally William H. Ginsburg et al.,
Contractual Revisions to Medical Malpractice Liability, 49 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 253 (1986).
230. In this connection, the health alliance envisioned under the "managed competition" approach
proposed by President Clinton could act as a sophisticated, powerful advocate for consumers. For one such
version by a prominent member of the President's task force, see STARR, supra note 125.
[Vol. 103: 899
Rethinking Informed Consent
patient's interests, when viewed ex ante, and there is no real evidence of
overreaching or lack of consent. A doctrine designed to advance patient
autonomy should not, through an unrealistically demanding notion of consent,
be deformed in ways that actually defeat that value.
V. CONCLUSION
Fiscal pressures on private and public payors have already caused far-
reaching changes in the health care system in the United States. These
pressures, as well as anxieties about the lack of insurance coverage for many
poor and middle-class Americans and concerns about international
competitiveness in the private sector, are generating even more fundamental
reforms. These developments will lead to a greater level of organization among
both providers and patients, more cost-consciousness and regulation by payors,
and some compromising of patient autonomy and pluralistic medical practice.
In this milieu, every institution and practice should be closely scrutinized to
ensure that it does whatever it seeks to do in a way that is better, cheaper, or
both.
The doctrine of informed consent is no exception. Although no one
contests its goals of patient autonomy and improved decisionmaking, its
present effectiveness in achieving those goals is quite limited; indeed, its most
sophisticated advocates accept this fact, even while condemning the informed
consent gap, which is a measure of this failure. I have expressed serious
doubts about whether, in light of certain largely intractable constraints, this gap
can be closed in the way these advocates suggest (i.e., by enforcing the law
in the books or by making it even tougher) and also about whether in an
increasingly cost-conscious health care system it ought to be closed in this
way. Instead, I suggest that informed consent be systematically analyzed (as
it has not been in the past), that comparative risk information be used to render
informed consent dialogues more useful to patients, and that the unitary
character of the existing informed consent arrangements be abandoned in favor
of doctrinal changes and contractual arrangements that can fragment,
differentiate, and contextualize it. In these ways, informed consent-the law
in action, in books, and eventually in the mind-can finally begin to fulfill its
alluring promise.
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